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Abstract
New developments in the world economy have triggered research designed to better under-
stand the changes in trade and investment patterns, and the reorganization of production across
national borders. Although traditional trade theory has much to oﬀer in explaining parts of this
puzzle, other parts required new approaches. Particularly acute has been the need to model
alternative forms of involvement of business ﬁrms in foreign activities, because organizational
change has been central in the transformation of the world economy. This paper reviews the
literature that has emerged from these eﬀorts.
The theoretical reﬁnements have focused on the individual ﬁrm, studying its choices in
response to its own characteristics, the nature of the industry in which it operates, and the
opportunities aﬀorded by foreign trade and investment. Important among these choices are or-
ganizational features, such as sourcing strategies. But the theory has gone beyond the individual
ﬁrm, studying the implications of ﬁrm behavior for the structure of industries. It provides new
explanations for trade structure and patterns of FDI, both within and across industries, and
has identiﬁed new sources of comparative advantage.
Keywords: international trade, foreign direct investment, comparative advantage, hetero-
geneity, incomplete contracts, organization of production.
JEL Classiﬁcation: D23, F1, F2.
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International trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) have been among the fastest growing eco-
nomic activities around the world. In 2003 world merchandise exports were close to 7.3 trillion
dollars; world exports of commercial services were close to 1.8 trillion dollars; and world FDI in-
ﬂows were close to 560 billion dollars.1 However, between 1990 and 2001 sales by foreign aﬃliates
of multinational corporations expanded much faster than exports of goods and nonfactor services.2
A striking feature of this growth has been an unprecedented expansion of FDI in services; the
inward stock of FDI in services increased from 950 billion dollars in 1990 to 4 trillion in 2002.3 In
2001-2002, services accounted for two-thirds of FDI inﬂows.
These remarkable ﬁgures mask equally remarkable changes in the nature of trade and FDI
ﬂows. The fast expansion of trade in services has been accompanied by fast-growing trade in
intermediate inputs.4 Moreover, the growth of input trade has taken place both within and across
the boundaries of the ﬁrm, i.e., as intraﬁrm and arm’s-length trade.5 In the U.S. the latter has
grown particularly fast. And many studies have documented the growth of international vertical
specialization, as reﬂected in the ﬂows of inputs across national borders for further processing and
ﬁnal assembly.6 These trends are closely related to the growing fragmentation of production, in
which multinational corporations play a central role. Technological change, such as computer-aided
design and computer-aided manufacturing, contributed to this process. And the same technological
changes also contributed to growing outsourcing within and across national borders.7
In addition to these broad trends, new data sets enable researchers to uncover previously un-
observed patterns of trade and FDI ﬂows. Especially important is the ﬁnding that a systematic
relationship exists between the characteristics of business ﬁrms and their participation in foreign
trade and investment. Exporting ﬁrms are not a random sample of the population of ﬁrms in an
industry, and neither are ﬁrms engaged in FDI. Only a small fraction of ﬁrms export, they are
larger and more productive than ﬁrms that serve only the domestic market, and more ﬁrms export
to larger markets.8 A small fraction of ﬁrms engage in FDI, and these ﬁrms are larger and more
1FDI inﬂows reached a peak of 1.4 trillion dollars in 2000, but declined from 2000 to 2003; see UNCTAD (2004).
According to UNCTAD (2002), foreign aﬃliates of multinational corporations accounted for 11% of world GDP and
35% of world trade in 2001. In the 1990s merchandise exports grew at an annual rate of 6.4% in real terms while
merchandise production grew at an annual rate of 2.5% only (see WTO (2004)).
2According to UNCTAD (2002), by almost 7% per year.
3See UNCTAD (2004).
4Ssee Yeats (2001).
5See Feenstra (1998) and Borga and Zeile (2004). According to Borga and Zeile (2004), exports of U.S. parent
companies to their foreign aﬃliates for further processing have increased from 8.5% of total U.S. exports of goods in
1966 to 14.7% in 1999, and from 39.3% of total exports of goods by U.S. parents to their foreign aﬃliates in 1966 to
64.7% in 1999. These shares vary substantially across industries; they are particularly large in electronic and other
electric equipment as well as in transportation equipment, and particularly small in petroleum manufacturing as well
as in food and kindred products.
6See, for example, Campa and Goldberg (1997) for the U.S., U.K. and Canada; Strauss-Kahn (2003) for France;
and Hummels, Rappoport and Yi (1998) and Hummels, Ishii and Yi (2001) for other OECD countries.
7See Abraham and Taylor (1996) and Bartel, Lach and Sicherman (2005) on outsourcing trends in the U.S.
8See Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz (2004). They report that only 17.4% of French ﬁrms in manufacturing industries
export, and they export 21.6% of the aggregate manufacturing output. These numbers hide large variations across
1productive than exporting ﬁrms. A lot of within-industry heterogeneity exists, and the distribution
of ﬁrms by size or productivity varies substantially across industries.9
Sourcing strategies of business ﬁrms have become more complex than ever before, and so have
the integration strategies of multinational corporations.10 As a result, the traditional classiﬁcation
of FDI into vertical and horizontal forms has become less meaningful in practice. Large multina-
tionals invest in low-cost countries to create export platforms from which they serve other countries
around the world, and the large ﬂows of FDI across industrial countries cannot be satisfactorily
classiﬁed as horizontal FDI.11
New theories have been developed to explain these changes. While the new theories do not
replace comparative advantage explanations of intersectoral trade and FDI ﬂows, nor do they
replace imperfect competition explanations of intra-industry trade, they do bring to trade theory
a new focus: the organizational choices of individual ﬁrms. By focusing on the characteristics of
individual ﬁrms, the theory can address new questions: Which ﬁrms serve foreign markets? And
how do they serve them, i.e., which choose to export and which choose to serve foreign markets
via FDI? How do they choose to organize production, do they outsource or integrate? Under what
circumstances do they outsource in a foreign country rather than at home? And if they choose
integration, under what circumstances do they choose to integrate in a foreign country, via FDI,
rather than to integrate at home?12
I discuss this literature in two sections. Section 2 examines insights from models of heteroge-
neous ﬁrms, in which the internalization decision, i.e., outsourcing versus integration, is put aside.
This proves to be a useful simpliﬁcation, because the resulting predictions go a long way toward
explaining why ﬁrms sort into exclusive domestic producers, exporters, or foreign direct investors,
and the structure of complex integration strategies. Naturally, these models cannot explain why
some ﬁrms outsource while others integrate. This issue is taken up in Section 3, which examines
the implications of the theory of incomplete contracts for internalization and oﬀshoring decisions.
The result is a trade theory with rich sourcing patterns.13
Various studies emphasize diﬀerent tradeoﬀs in the decision to internalize or oﬀshore, and no
model integrates all considerations into a single framework. But the studies discussed in Section 3
industries, however. In food and tobacco industries, for example, only 5.5% of the ﬁrms export, while in chemicals
55.4% of the ﬁrms export.
9See Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2005) for a portrait of U.S. ﬁrms.
10See UNCTAD (1998).
11See Ekholm, Forslid and Markusen (2004) and Feinberg and Keane (2003). See also Section 2.5 for more details.
12I attach traditional meanings to the terms "outsourcing" and "integration." That is, outsourcing means the
acquisition of an intermediate input or service from an unaﬃliated supplier, while integration means production of
the intermediate input or service within the boundary of the ﬁrm. These choices are distinct from the choice of
country in which to engage in these activities, because outsourcing can be carried out in the home country of the
ﬁrm, or in any number of foreign countries, and similarly for integration.
13Some of the issues examined in Section 3 are discussed in Spencer (2005). I have chosen to focus on incomplete
contracts, thereby not covering the work on managerial incentives, such as Grossman and Helpman (2004) and Marin
and Verdier (2005). The reason for this choice is that there is a lot of common ground in the approaches reviewed in
Section 3, while the papers on managerial incentives are somewhat idiosyncratic. I also do not review earlier work on
incomplete contracts, such as Spencer and Qiu (2001) and Qiu and Spencer (2002), which have a narrow focus, such
as Keiretsu-type organizations, and have no obvious implications for the broader issues discussed in the introduction.
2all build on a common assumption, namely that some inputs are highly speciﬁct oaﬁnal product
and that their supply is not fully contractible. This assumption is enough to study (1) the impact
of variations across industries in the intensity of inputs that suﬀer from agency problems; (2)
Ricardian-type comparative advantage, that arises when legal systems of diﬀerent quality interact
with sectoral diﬀerences in contract dependency; (3) the impact of diﬀerent degrees of contract
incompleteness, which may vary across countries; (4) the role of matching between buyers and
sellers of intermediate inputs, and the resulting "thick market" eﬀect; and (5) the interaction
between within-industry heterogeneity with incomplete contracts, which yields joint predictions
about internalization and oﬀshoring. In particular, it predicts the relative prevalence of the four
main organizational forms: integration at home, outsourcing at home, integration abroad, and
outsourcing abroad.
While the main purpose of this article is to review the theoretical literature, I report empirical
evidence wherever possible. The interplay between theory and empirics is particularly important
here, because many of these theoretical studies have been motivated by evidence. As one would
expect, the theoretical models deliver new empirical implications that can be confronted with data.
I report empirical studies that do that, but other empirical implications have not yet been tested.
Some will undoubtedly be tested in the near future ,w h i l eo t h e r sw i l lh a v et ow a i t ,b e c a u s et h e y
r e q u i r ed a t at h a ta r en o ty e ta v a i l a b l e . T h e s ei ssues are discussed in the closing section of the
paper.
2 Heterogeneous Productivity
In the 1980s trade theory introduced within-industry heterogeneity resulting from product diﬀeren-
tiation and monopolistic competition. Heterogeneity in these studies was not designed, however, to
explain asymmetries across ﬁrms in productivity or size. Not because it was not known at the time
that ﬁrms diﬀer along these dimensions, but rather because the aim was to explain large volumes
of trade between countries with similar factor compositions and large volumes of intra-industry
trade. For this purpose diﬀerences in productivity or size were not considered to be important.
As a result, the models assumed (for the most part) symmetry across ﬁrms within an industry
in terms of the available technology, which implied in turn similar productivity levels and similar
participation in foreign trade. The monopolistic competition models implied that all ﬁrms export
to all countries, unless there is pressure for the formation of multinational corporations.14
Detailed empirical studies of exporting ﬁrms have led to a recognition of the limitations of the
symmetry assumption. As new ﬁrm-level data became available, it became clear that not all ﬁrms
within an industry export, nor are exporting ﬁrms a random sample of the population of ﬁrms
in an industry. This evidence accumulated in the 1990s and showed that only a small fraction
14See Helpman and Krugman (1985, Chapters 7 and 12). Diﬀerential incipient pressure on factor prices across
countries can lead to the formation of multinational corporations despite the prevalence of factor price equalization.
Under these circumstances some ﬁrms become multinationals while others do not. This produces asymmetries in the
organizational forms of diﬀerent ﬁrms in the same industry, and diﬀerent trading patterns, but these ﬁr m sd on o t
diﬀer in productivity or size.
3of ﬁrms export and that exporters are larger and more productive than non-exporters.15 Eaton,
Kortum and Kramarz (2004) ﬁnd, for example, that in the mid 1980s only 17.4% of French ﬁrms in
manufacturing industries exported, that they exported only 21.6% of their output, and that both
averages hide wide variations across industries. And Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) report
that in a large 1996 sample of U.S. ﬁrms exporters had a 39% labor productivity advantage over
non-exporters.16 Finally, there appear to exist large sunk costs of exporting, in developed and
developing countries alike.17
In view of these ﬁndings, Melitz (2003) developed a theoretical model of monopolistic com-
petition with heterogeneous ﬁrms, that was designed to explain these features of the data.18 His
model has become the cornerstone of a growing literature that examines the role of heterogeneity in
international trade and foreign direct investment.19 The success of Melitz’s model derives from the
fact that, when combined with old and new approaches to trade theory, it yields rich predictions
that can be confronted with data, and so far the model has performed admirably well.
The main insights from Melitz’s model are derived from an interaction between productivity
diﬀerences across ﬁrms and ﬁxed costs of exporting. The ﬁxed export costs are interpreted as
distribution and servicing costs in foreign markets, and a ﬁrm has to bear them in every country
to which it exports. As a result, the total ﬁxed export costs are larger the more foreign countries
the ﬁrm chooses to serve.20
To illustrate the nature of these interactions, consider an industry supplying a diﬀerentiated
product, in which each of a continuum of ﬁrms manufactures a diﬀerent brand. The demand
function for ﬁrm j’s brand is x(j)=Ap(j)
−ε,w h e r ex is the quantity and p is the price, A is a
measure of the demand level, and ε ≡ 1/(1 − α) is the demand elasticity. The demand elasticity is
assumed to be constant, with 0 <α<1, which implies ε>1.21 Although the demand level A is
15See Clerides, Lach and Tybout (1998) for Colombia, Mexico and Morocco; Bernard and Jensen (1999) for the
U.S.; Aw, Chung and Roberts (2000) for Taiwan; Delgado, Fariñas and Ruano (2002) for Spain; and Baldwin and
Gu (2003) for Canada.
16A detailed account of the characteristics of U.S. ﬁrms that trade in goods is provided by Bernard, Jensen and
Schott (2005). In their data too only a small fraction of ﬁrms export and they export a small fraction of their own
output.
17See Roberts and Tybout (1997) for Colombia and Bernard and Jensen (2004) for the U.S. While these studies
only report large persistence in exporting status, Das, Roberts and Tybout (2005) use a structural model to estimate
t h es i z eo fs u n ke x p o r t i n gc o s t sf o rC o l o m b i a nﬁrms in three industries. They ﬁnd that the sunk costs for small
producers are between $412,000 and $430,000, and for large producers between $344,000 and $402,000. Moreover,
they ﬁnd that ﬁxed exporting costs are important for at least some of these ﬁrms.
18Other, related models of this type, are developed in Montagna (2001) and Jean (2002). In addition, Bernard,
Eaton, Jensen and Kortum (2004) propose a model of heterogeneous ﬁrms with a diﬀerent market structure (i.e.,
Bertrand competition instead of monopolistic competition) in order to address similar questions. I focus on Melitz
(2003), because his model has proved to be most adaptable to a wide range of applications, including integration
with the literature on incomplete contracts and the international organization of production (see Section 3). Baldwin
(2005) provides an alternative discussion of this model.
19Melitz (2003) builds on the work of Hopenhayn (1992), who studied the entry and exit dynamics of ﬁrms in an
industry.
20Earlier studies, including Baldwin (1988), Baldwin and Krugman (1989), Dixit (1989) and Roberts and Tybout
(1997), used sunk costs of exporting, yet only Roberts and Tybout touch upon some of the issues addressed by Melitz.
Their model, which is designed to estimate the impact of sunk costs on export decisions, is not as useful, however,
for dealing with the wide range of issues to which Melitz’s model has been applied.







Figure 1: Producing and Nonproducing Firms
endogenous to the industry, it is treated as exogenous by producers, because every producer is of
negligible size relative to the size of the industry.
Firm j discovers its productivity θ(j) only after it enters the industry. Let c/θ(j) be its
variable production cost per unit of output and let cfD be its ﬁxed cost, where c measures the
cost of resources (e.g., the wage rate when there is only labor input); and fD is a measure of
ﬁxed production costs in terms of resources. Then, if the ﬁrm chooses to sell the product, its
proﬁt-maximizing strategy is to charge p(j)=c/αθ(j), which yields the operating proﬁts π(j)=
θ(j)
ε−1 B − cfD,w h e r eB ≡ (1 − α)A(c/α)
1−ε.
Figure 1 depicts these proﬁts as a function of the productivity measure Θ ≡ θε−1.T h e ﬁrm
index j is dropped, because proﬁts do not depend on the identity of the ﬁrm, only on its productivity
level; ﬁrms with higher productivity have higher proﬁts. The proﬁt function in the ﬁgure is:
πD (Θ)=ΘB − cfD.( 1 )
As is evident from the ﬁgure, ﬁrms with productivity levels below ΘD choose not to produce, because
for these ﬁrms variable proﬁts do not cover their ﬁxed cost, while ﬁrms with higher productivity
supply their brands to the market. Given a productivity distribution G(Θ) we can calculate the
fraction of ﬁrms that serve the domestic market as the fraction of ﬁrms with productivity above
the cutoﬀ ΘD.
utility or production function. In this event A = E/
U
j∈J p(j)
1−ε dj,w h e r eE is total spending on these products












Figure 2: Exporting and Non-Exporting Firms
2.1 Export
Now interpret the proﬁt function πD (Θ) as applying to sales in the domestic market, so that A
is the demand level in the domestic market. And assume that ﬁrms can sell their products in
country   as well, which has the demand function x(j)=A p(j)
−ε. That is, the demand elasticity
is the same in the two markets, but the demand level is not necessarily the same at home as in
country  . In addition, there are melting iceberg trading costs for the shipment of every brand
o ft h ep r o d u c tf r o mh o m et o , such that τ>1 units have to be shipped for one unit to arrive,
and there are ﬁxed export costs cfX. The variable trading costs typically include transport costs,
insurance, fees, duties, and other impediments that may stem from language barriers, diﬀerences
in the legal systems, and the like.22 Under these circumstances a ﬁrm that chooses to sell in the
domestic market, i.e., one with productivity Θ > ΘD,c a nm a k eadditional proﬁts
π 
X (Θ)=τ1−εΘB  − cfX (2)
from export sales, where B  ≡ (1 − α)A  (c/α)
1−ε.
Figure 2 depicts both πD (Θ) and π 
X (Θ), for the case in which A  = A (thus B  = B)a n d
τε−1fX >f D. When the two demand levels are the same, πD is steeper than π 
X as a result of the
trading costs, and the assumption on the relative size of the ﬁxed costs then ensures Θ 
X > ΘD.
It follows that low-productivity ﬁrms, with Θ < ΘD, still choose to close down, because they lose
money from domestic sales as well as from exporting, while ﬁrms with productivity above ΘD make
money from serving the domestic market. Now, however, high-productivity ﬁrms, with Θ > Θ 
X,
also make money from exporting. Such ﬁrms choose, therefore, to serve the domestic market as
22See Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) for estimates of the size of these costs.
6well as the market in  . Firms with intermediate productivity levels, between ΘD and Θ 
X, attain
the highest proﬁts by serving the domestic market only, i.e., they choose not to export. The sorting
pattern depicted in this ﬁgure implies that exporting ﬁrms are more productive than non-exporters
and that they are bigger. The last implication follows from the fact that more-productive ﬁrms sell
more in the domestic market and they sell in the foreign country as well. Evidently, this model’s
predictions are consistent with the data, in which exporters are larger and more productive than
non-exporters.
Next observe that we can add as many proﬁt functions from exporting as there are foreign
countries `. Assuming that the foreign countries diﬀer only in market size, Ac, would then imply a
n e g a t i v ec o r r e l a t i o nb e t w e e nm a r k e ts i z ea n dt h ee x p o r tc u t o ﬀ Θc
X. That is, the smaller the foreign
country ` the larger its cutoﬀ Θc
X. For simplicity, suppose that minc Θc
X > ΘD.23 In this event all
exporting ﬁrms sell in the domestic market too, and there exist ﬁrms, with productivity between ΘD
and minc Θc
X, which serve the domestic market but do not export. All ﬁrms with productivity levels
above minc Θc
X export. In this multicountry world, the positive correlation between productivity
and export status is preserved. In addition, we obtain a new prediction which is consistent with
the data: there exists a positive correlation between the size of an export market and the number
of ﬁrms that export to it.24 Naturally, this correlation may not hold when the trading cost τ is
not the same with every foreign country. Nevertheless, it should still hold once we control for the
cross-country variation in trading costs.
2.2 Turnover
I described a static version of Melitz’s (2003) model. This is suﬃcient for the issues discussed
above as well as for a number of other issues to be discussed below. Yet, the original formulation of
the model is dynamic, shedding light on entry, exit and turnover of ﬁrms. In the dynamic version
of the model, the ﬁxed production and export costs fD and fX have to be borne every period.
There also exists an entry cost fE that is a capital cost; it has to be borne only once, at entry.
Moreover, there is a constant probability of death δe of every ﬁrm, irrespective of its productivity.
In this setting free entry requires the expected present value of proﬁts to equal the entry cost. In a
steady state ﬁrms constantly leave the industry, as a fraction δe die every period. At the same time
there is a constant inﬂow of new ﬁrms, and a fraction of these ﬁrms – those whose productivity is
above the cutoﬀ ΘD – remain in the industry. In the steady state equilibrium the inﬂow equals
the outﬂow, so that the number of ﬁrms remains constant in every productivity category. As a
result, the ratio of new entrants per period to the stock of active ﬁrms, a measure of turnover,
equals δe/[1 − G(ΘD)],w h e r eG(·) is the cumulative distribution of Θ.25 This setup can be used
to study the determinants of turnover, which I illustrate in the next section with a discussion of
23This should be true in big countries but may not be true in small countries. In any case, the analysis can be
carried out without this assumption.
24See the evidence in Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz (2004) for French ﬁrms.
25Let N be the stock of active ﬁrms and let nE be the ﬂow of new entrants per period. Then [1 − G(ΘD)]nE is the

















Figure 3: Multinationals, Exporting, and Non-Exporting Firms
trade liberalization.
2.3 Trade Liberalization
Consider multilateral trade liberalization, which leads to a proportional reduction of trading costs
τ in all countries. On impact, this reduction in trading costs raises the proﬁts of exporters and
reduces the cutoﬀ Θ 
X. As a result, a larger proportion of ﬁrms choose to export. But the presence
of a larger number of exporters in a market reduces the demand facing every supplier, which cuts
into the proﬁts of exporters and non-exporters alike.26 After allowing the general equilibrium
eﬀects to work themselves out, the ﬁnal outcome is a lower export cutoﬀ Θ 
X (although not as
low as one would predict from the impact eﬀect) and a higher domestic cutoﬀ ΘD.I t f o l l o w s
that trade liberalization leads to higher average productivity, since only the more-productive ﬁrms
survive entry, and a larger turnover of ﬁrms. These are interesting implications, which illustrate
important issues that this model can address, and which could not be addressed by earlier models
of international trade. Moreover, Treﬂer (2004) ﬁnds that both of these predictions are consistent
with the impact of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement on Canadian industries.27
2.4 Horizontal FDI
Melitz’s (2003) model can be generalized to handle horizontal foreign direct investment. The
traditional classiﬁcation of FDI has been into horizontal and vertical FDI, where the former concerns
subsidiaries that serve the local market in the host country while the latter concerns subsidiaries
26See the determinants of the demand level A in footnote 21.
27Tybout and Westbrook (1995) also ﬁnd important market share reallocations from low to high productivity plants
in response to trade liberalization in Mexico.
8that add value to products that are not destined (necessarily) for the host country market (more
on this in the next section).28 Following Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004), suppose that a home-
country ﬁrm can build a (second) production facility in country  ,a tc o s tcfI, that will enable it to
produce its brand of the product in country   at unit cost c /θ,w h e r eθ is the ﬁrm’s productivity.
Then if the ﬁrm exports to country  ,i t sp r o ﬁts from exporting are given by (2), while if it chooses
to serve the foreign market via FDI, the ﬁrm’s proﬁts from FDI are
π 
I (Θ)=ΘB 
I − cfD, (3)
where B 
I ≡ (1 − α)A  ¡
c /α
¢1−ε. Comparing (2) with (3) we note that, as long as fI >f X
and c  <c τ,t h eﬁrm faces a proximity-concentration tradeoﬀ, for which Brainard (1997) provides
empirical evidence. Namely, by choosing FDI instead of exporting the ﬁrm gives up concentration
of production, which raises its ﬁxed costs, but saves on variable unit costs by avoiding trade costs
(and possibly on unit production costs). Figure 3 describes this tradeoﬀ for the case in which c  = c,
B 
I = B  (i.e., the demand level is the same in the two countries), and fI >τ ε−1fX >f D. Under
these circumstances Θ 
I > Θ 
X > ΘD. It follows that the most productive ﬁrms, with Θ > Θ 
I,
serve the foreign market via subsidiary sales; lower productivity ﬁrms, with Θ 
X < Θ < Θ 
I,s e r v e
the foreign market via export; and still lower productivity ﬁrms, with ΘD < Θ < Θ 
X,s e r v eo n l y
the domestic market. Evidently, this sorting pattern is consistent with the empirical evidence that
multinational corporations are more productive than exporters who are not multinationals, and
exporters who are not multinationals are more productive than ﬁrms who serve only the domestic
market.29 Since more productive ﬁrms produce more output, this sorting pattern also implies that
multinational ﬁrms are larger than exporters, and exporters are larger than ﬁrms who serve only
the domestic market.
Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) also show that when the distribution of productivity θ is
characterized by a Pareto distribution, the size distribution of ﬁrms also is Pareto, and the model
then predicts more subsidiary sales relative to export sales in sectors with greater productivity
(and therefore size) dispersion. This is a particularly interesting implication, because it suggests
that heterogeneity can be a source of comparative advantage. The use of a Pareto distribution is
compelling in this case, because the actual size distribution of ﬁr m si sw e l la p p r o x i m a t e db ys u c ha
distribution (see Axtell (2001)). Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple also show that the shape parameter
of a Pareto distribution can be precisely estimated in almost every one of 52 sectors for which they
have data, and these estimates exhibit large variations in the degree of dispersion across sectors.
Using these measures of dispersion, as well as nonparametric measures, they estimate the impact
of heterogeneity on the ratio of subsidiary sales to export sales of U.S. ﬁrms in a sample of 27
28According to the BEA data, the destination of sales of U.S. subsidiaries are distributed as follows: 65% in the
host country markets, 11% in the U.S., and 24% in other countries (see Landefeld and Mataloni (2004)).
29Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) ﬁnd that in 1996 U.S. ﬁrms that engaged in FDI had a 15% labor productivity
advantage over exporters who did not engage in FDI, and the latter had a 39% labor productivity advantage over
ﬁrms who engaged in neither export nor FDI. See also Head and Ries (2003) for evidence from Japan; Girma, Görg
and Strobl (2004) for evidence from Ireland; and Girma, Kneller and Pisu (2005) for evidence from the U.K.
9countries, and a broader sample of 38 countries, both in 1994. Their estimates, which control for
the variation in ﬁxed costs and other relevant variables, are precise and consistent with the theory.
Moreover, the estimates are large economically; they compare in size to the impact of freight, tariﬀs,
and measures of ﬁxed costs on the ratio of export to subsidiary sales, which have been routinely
used in studies of the proximity-concentration tradeoﬀ.30
2.5 Technology Adoption
Bustos (2005) introduces a technology choice into Melitz’s (2003) model, in order to study the
impact of trade liberalization on technology upgrading in Argentina. For this purpose suppose that
a ﬁrm located in Argentina can serve the domestic market or it can serve the domestic market
and also export to a foreign market (we disregard the FDI option). But unlike the Melitz model,
now, upon entry, and after learning its productivity θ,t h eﬁrm can choose to use an advanced
technology H or a traditional technology L. The advanced technology requires higher ﬁxed costs,
so that fDH >f DL, but its advantage is that is has lower variable costs, so that variable unit costs
are caH/θ if the ﬁrm uses technology H and caL/θ if the ﬁrm uses technology L, aH <a L.W i t h
suitable restrictions on these parameters, a ﬁrm with productivity below a cutoﬀ ΘD exits the
industry, because all choices aﬀord it negative operating proﬁts, a ﬁrm with productivity between
ΘD and ΘXL uses technology L to serve the domestic market only, a ﬁrm with productivity between
ΘXL and ΘXH uses technology L to serve the domestic market and to export, and a ﬁrm with
productivity above ΘXH uses technology H to serve the domestic market and to export. Naturally,
ΘXH > ΘXL > ΘD. In other words, more productive ﬁrms use the more advanced technology, but
some low-productivity exporters use the traditional technology. This sorting pattern is consistent
with Bustos’ data.
Now consider multilateral trade liberalization, which reduces trading costs to Argentinian ﬁrms.
This raises the operating proﬁts of all exporters, but proportionately more so from the use of the
advanced technology if an exporter’s productivity is close to ΘXH.A sar e s u l t ,ΘXH declines, and
some exporters who used technology L switch to H, while exporters who used the better technology
have no incentive to switch to technology L. Firms that serve only the domestic market also have no
incentive to switch technologies, and they keep using technology L. The model therefore predicts
that only ﬁrms with intermediate productivity levels upgrade their technology in response to trade
liberalization. And indeed, Bustos ﬁnds an inverted U-shaped relationship between productivity
and technology upgrading in Argentina.31
30The comparability in size is of beta, or standardized, coeﬃcients.
31Bustos (2005) also examines skill upgrading, which is positively correlated with the upgrading of technology. She
ﬁnds that of the 17% rise in the demand for skilled workers after trade liberalization, 15% took place within ﬁrms,
in each of three skill categories: production, nonproduction, and R&D workers. Since she has data on the education
level of workers within each one of these skill categories, she measures skill upgrading as the rise in average years of
schooling.
102.6 Complex Integration Strategies
Although horizontal FDI of the type described in the previous section is prevalent, the evidence
points to a growing importance of more complex integration strategies by multinational corpora-
tions. Feinberg and Keane (2003) ﬁnd, for example, that among U.S. multinationals with aﬃliates
in Canada, only 12 percent are of the purely horizontal type (i.e., they have negligible intraﬁrm
ﬂows of intermediate inputs) and only 19 percent are of the purely vertical type (i.e., they have
negligible intraﬁrm ﬂows of intermediate inputs in one direction only). The remaining 69 percent of
the ﬁrms pursue more complex integration strategies.32 Yeaple (2003) provides the ﬁrst analysis of
such complex strategies, identifying an important complementarity between the two types of FDI.
In what follows I brieﬂy discuss insights from Grossman, Helpman and Szeidl (2005b) who combine
heterogeneity features from Melitz (2003) with the modelling of the two types of FDI from Yeaple
(2003) in order to explore patterns of FDI in an environment that oﬀers a rich choice of integration
strategies.
The model has a simple structure. There are two symmetric countries in the North and one
country in the South. Every Northern country has a population of ﬁrms who know how to produce
varieties of a diﬀerentiated product. A typical ﬁrm has a production function θF (m,a),w h e r eθ
is (as before) a ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity level and F (·) is a concave constant-returns-to-scale pro-
duction function, common to all ﬁrms; m represents intermediate inputs and a represents assembly.
That is, every ﬁnal good is produced with a combination of intermediate inputs and assembly. The
elasticity of substitution between m and a is smaller than one. And in this model there are no ﬁxed
manufacturing costs fD nor ﬁxed exporting costs fX.
Intermediate inputs and assembly are produced from a bundle of primary inputs at cost c per
unit, where c is higher in the North than in the South. As a result, there is a cost advantage to
locating these activities in South, unless other costs enter the calculus. To introduce a tradeoﬀ
in the location decision, it is assumed that no ﬁxed costs are borne by a ﬁrm that locates both
activities in the Northern country in which it is headquartered, but that such a ﬁrm has to bear
a ﬁxed cost g if it locates the production of intermediates in a diﬀerent country and a ﬁxed cost
f if it locates assembly in a diﬀerent country. The ﬁrm may also incur transport costs for either
intermediate inputs or ﬁnal goods. In combination, this cost structure induces a nontrivial decision
problem in which the optimal integration strategy depends on these cost parameters as well as on
the demand levels in the three countries. The demand function is Ap(j)
−ε (as before), and A is
higher in a Northern country than in South.
First consider the case in which there are no transport costs. Then, given the ﬁxed cost f of
FDI in assembly, there are four integration strategies that may be chosen by a ﬁrm in equilibrium,
depending on the ﬁxed cost of FDI in intermediates g and the ﬁrm’s productivity. They are depicted
in Figure 4. Region {S,H} describes a strategy whereby the ﬁrm manufactures intermediates
in South and assembles ﬁnal goods in the home country, i.e., the country in which the ﬁrm is
headquartered. The other regions have similar interpretations; the ﬁrst letter denotes the location
32See also UNCTAD (1998), where the term "complex integration strategies" was coined.
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Figure 4: Optimal Integration Strategies
of intermediate inputs while the second letter denotes the location of assembly. The ﬁxed cost of
FDI in intermediate inputs varies along the vertical axis while the productivity measure Θ ≡ θε−1
varies along the horizontal axis.
W es e et h a tf o rl o wﬁxed costs g the least-productive ﬁrms perform both activities at home,
intermediate-productivity ﬁrms produce intermediates in South and assemble ﬁnal goods at home,
and high-productivity ﬁrms perform both activities in South. That is, the least-productive ﬁrms
do not engage in FDI; they produce intermediates and perform assembly in the home country and
export the ﬁnal product to the other Northern country and to South. Firms with intermediate
productivity engage in partial FDI; they produce intermediate inputs in South, import them to
the home country, assemble them there into a ﬁnal product, and then export the ﬁnal product to
the other Northern country and to South. Finally, the most-productive ﬁrms engage in FDI to the
greatest possible extent; they produce intermediate inputs in South and assemble there the ﬁnal
product. The ﬁnal product is then exported to the two Northern countries, i.e., the South serves
as an export platform to the rest of the world.33
The ﬁgure also shows that for an intermediate range of FDI costs g there are only two optimal
integration strategies; low productivity ﬁrms do everything at home while high productivity ﬁrms
do everything in South. Finally, for high values of g low productivity ﬁrms do everything at home,
the highest productivity ﬁrms do everything in South, and ﬁrms in between produce intermediates
in the home country and assemble ﬁnal goods in South.
It is also clear from the ﬁgure that, given a distribution of Θ, the fraction of ﬁrms that do both
activities at home is rising with g while the fraction of ﬁrms that do both activities in South is
declining with g. Moreover, as shown by the broken lines, the fraction of ﬁrms that assemble ﬁnal
33See also Ekholm, Forslid and Markusen (2004) on export-platform FDI.
12goods in South declines with g. That is, FDI in intermediates and in assembly are complementary;
as the ﬁxed cost of FDI in intermediate goods increases, the fraction of ﬁrms assembling in South
declines.34
In the absence of trading costs horizontal FDI has no economic justiﬁcation. And indeed, Figure
4 shows no instance in which a ﬁrm in one Northern country chooses to perform assembly in the
other Northern country. At most there is vertical FDI (region {S,H}) and complex integration
(region {S,S}). But horizontal FDI becomes a viable option when trade in ﬁnal goods is costly. So
consider a modiﬁed version of this model with melting iceberg transport costs of ﬁnal goods (but
still free trade in intermediate inputs). For low transport costs the equilibrium integration strategies
are the same as in Figure 4. But for intermediate levels of such transport costs, and relatively low
demand in South, the multinationals pursue diﬀerent integration strategies for high values of g.
The least-productive ﬁrms perform both activities in the home country while the most-productive
ﬁrms perform both activities in South. However, ﬁrms with productivity between these extremes
produce intermediate inputs in the home country, but choose diﬀerent strategies for serving foreign
markets, depending on how productive they are within this range; the less-productive ﬁrms choose
subsidiary sales in the other Northern country and export to South, while the more-productive ﬁrms
choose subsidiary sales in both foreign countries. As a result, all these ﬁrms engage in horizontal
FDI, except that the more-productive ﬁrms do not export at all; they serve every market with
local subsidiary sales. In this case too there is complementarity between the two forms of FDI; as g
increases, a smaller fraction of ﬁrms engage in subsidiary sales in foreign countries.35 As Grossman,
Helpman and Szeidl (2005b) show, this type of complementarily is robust, in the sense that it holds
also for high transport costs of ﬁnal goods and for high transport costs of intermediate inputs.36
2.7 Variable Markups
The constant-elasticity demand function that was used above has been the workhorse of monopolis-
tic competition studies in economics, including international trade. It is a convenient tool in many
applications, and it is easily derived from either CES preferences or a CES production function. It
has one particularly undesirable feature, however: it implies that markups depend neither on cost
nor on demand levels.37 As a result, the distribution of prices is a scaled version of the distribution
34This is what Grossman, Helpman and Szeidl (2005b) call unit-cost complementarity, which has its origin in Yeaple
(2003). It arises from the fact that when intermediates are produced in South at lower unit cost, it becomes more
attractive to assemble ﬁnal goods there because the larger ﬁnal good sales make it easier to cover the ﬁxed cost of
FDI in assembly.
35The composition of FDI in assembly is now driven by an additional source of complementarity, what Grossman,
Helpman and Szeidl (2005b) call source-of-components complementarity, which stems from the fact that, for moderate
transport costs of ﬁnal goods, a Northern market is cheaper to serve from assembly lines in South if and only if
intermediate inputs are also produced in South.
36When transport costs of ﬁnal goods are high and the demand level in South is not very high, ﬁrms do not assemble
ﬁnal goods in South for export to North; they either export from the home country or they serve foreign markets
through subsidiary sales.
37A ﬁrm with marginal cost c/θ that faces the demand function x(j)=Ap(j)
−ε,w h e r eε =1 /(1 − α) > 0,
maximizes proﬁts by charging price p(j)=c/αθ. Under these circumstances the ratio of price to marginal cost –
which is a measure of the markup – equals 1/α, and it does not depend on marginal cost. Moreover, it does not
13of marginal costs, with no impact of market size or the number of competitors on the shape of
the price distribution. Yet empirical evidence on regional markets in the U.S. suggests that higher
demand, as measured by market density, reduces markups and price dispersion.38 Moreover, with
this type of demand, free entry implies that total spending on the industry’s products has no eﬀect
on ﬁrm size, because higher spending raises the demand level A but entry of new ﬁrms then reduces
this demand level, so that at the end of the process A does not change.39 This too is inconsistent
with the evidence; market size actually is positively correlated with ﬁrm size.40 In order to accom-
modate these features of the data, it is necessary to ﬁnd an alternative speciﬁcation of demand, in
which markups are endogenous. The theory will be more consistent with the evidence when the
model implies that a larger market size reduces a ﬁrm’s markup, because in this case the ﬁrm also
raises sales at constant cost and productivity.
Although comparable evidence on variation across countries does not exist, it is quite likely
that markups, prices and ﬁrm size vary across countries in similar fashion. To address these issues,
Melitz and Ottaviano (2005) combine supply-side features from Melitz (2003) with demand side
features from Ottaviano, Tabuchi and Thisse (2002) to construct a model of international trade
with variable markups, in which market size aﬀects average prices, price dispersion, and ﬁrm size.
The model yields interesting predictions concerning trade and the impact of trade liberalization on
productivity and price distributions.
Ottaviano, Tabuchi and Thisse (2002) use the following quadratic, quasilinear utility function:



















where x0 is consumption of an outside good that yields constant marginal utility, J is the set of
brands available in the market, and ζ and η are positive parameters. When γ =0all brands
are prefect substitutes, and the brands are less substitutable for each other the larger is γ.41 Let
γ>0. Then, assuming that the consumer has enough income to justify positive consumption of










depend on the demand level A.
38See Syverson (2005) for a study of ready-mixed concrete plants.
39For simplicity, consider a closed economy, with no export opportunities. Using the optimal pricing strategy
p(j)=c/αθ,aﬁrm with productivity θ earns operating proﬁts that equal either ΘB − cfD or zero, whichever is
larger, where B =( 1 − α)A(c/α)
1−ε (see (1)). Then free entry implies that the expected present value of these
operating proﬁts equals the entry cost. This free entry condition depends on the cutoﬀ ΘD and on the demand level
A. Together with the equation for the cutoﬀ, i.e., ΘDB = cfD, the two equations uniquely determine the cutoﬀ ΘD
and the value of A. It follows that larger spending on these products is precisely oﬀset by a larger number of entrants
(brands) so that A is not aﬀected.
40See Campbell and Hopenhayn (2005) for evidence on retail trade industries across U.S. cities.
41This utility function represents preferences over two goods: a homogeneous outside good x0 and a diﬀerentiated
product with consumption x(j) of brand j. It can be generalized to many goods.
14where N is the number of products he consumes and ¯ p is the average price of these products.42 This
is a linear demand function in which the demand level is decreasing in the own price, increasing
in the average price ¯ p (i.e., the competitors’ prices), and declining in the number of products N.43
That is, as the competitive pressure intensiﬁes, either because prices of competing products decline
or the number of competing products increases, the manufacturer of brand j faces lower demand.44
In an economy populated by Q such consumers, aggregate demand for the brand equals Qx(j).












Under these circumstances, the markup – deﬁned as the ratio of price to marginal cost – is
increasing in the average price and declining in the number of products. Moreover, the markup is
increasing in γ, implying that it is higher the less substitutable are brands for each other.
In this model ﬁrms with very low productivity do not produce even if they bear no ﬁxed
production costs fD, because demand drops to zero at a ﬁnite price.45 It is then possible to solve
the entire model of a closed economy by adding a free entry condition, with or without a positive
ﬁxed cost fD.T h es o l u t i o nf o rθD then implies that the cutoﬀ for positive production is declining
in γ and in Q. That is, less-productive ﬁrms survive entry the less substitutable the products are
for each other and the larger the market size is. It follows that in sectors with less substitutability
there is more productivity and size dispersion and average productivity is lower.46
Melitz and Ottaviano (2005) assume that countries diﬀer only in their numbers of consumers
Q, that there are neither ﬁxed production nor ﬁxed export costs, but that there are variable trade
costs τ>0. The trade costs introduce a degree of market segmentation that produces cross-
country variation in the number of consumed products that is positively correlated with market
42The consumer chooses to purchase all products with
p(j) ≤
ζγ + ηN¯ p
γ + ηN
,
a n di na ne q u i l i b r i u mw i t ht h e s et y p e so fc o n s u m e r st h es e tJ consists only of such products.
43Note that the inequality in the previous footnote together with (4) imply ¯ p ≤ ζ.
44Neary (2003) uses a related demand structure in his model of general oligopolistic competition, in which prefer-
ences are not quasi linear and η =0 . Nevertheless, in his case too the demand level of a single product depends on
the average price of other products, because it aﬀects the marginal utility of consumption.
45With fD =0 , demand is not negative for
p(j) ≤
ζγ + ηN¯ p
γ + ηN
.




ζγ + ηN¯ p
γ + ηN
.
Therefore the cutoﬀ productivity level θD satisﬁes
θD = c
γ + ηN
ζγ + ηN¯ p
.
46Syverson (2004) provides evidence of these eﬀects for a cross section of U.S. manufacturing industries.
15size, as measured by the number of consumers. Moreover, average productivity is higher in larger
markets, because low-productivity ﬁrms ﬁnd it harder to compete in larger markets. This is similar
to the result in Melitz (2003), but for diﬀerent reasons. In Melitz (2003) trade raises the proﬁts
of high-productivity ﬁrms – which export – and these exporters raise the demand for domestic
inputs. As a result, domestic producers who do not export are hit by competition from foreign
exporters on the one hand and by higher input prices on the other, which forces the least productive
of them to leave the business. The cutoﬀ θD increases, and so does average productivity. In contrast,
in Melitz and Ottaviano (2005), trade does not change input prices, but it reduces markups as a
result of the increase in competitive pressure from foreign exporters, and this raises the cutoﬀ θD
and average productivity. The implication is that not only do consumers in larger markets have
access to more products, they also pay lower prices.47
Multilateral liberalization raises the number of products in all markets, which raises competition
and cuts into markups. Only more-productive ﬁrms survive this pressure, resulting in higher
productivity and lower prices. Evidently, this sort of trade liberalization is beneﬁcial to all countries
concerned. In contrast, when only a subset of countries liberalize trade amongst themselves, the
impact on the liberalizing countries diﬀers markedly from the impact on the excluded countries.
In the former countries average productivity rises, markups and prices decline, and the number of
products increases. The opposite takes place in the excluded countries. Under these circumstances
the liberalizing countries gain while the other countries lose.
2.8 Factor Proportions
Although Melitz (2003) places the ﬁrm at the center of analysis, his approach has implications for
trade ﬂows at the sectoral level. This is apparent from the fact that sectoral average productivity
levels are endogenous, and they depend on the determinants of the sectoral cutoﬀs, θD (or ΘD).
These endogenous productivity levels generate Ricardian-type comparative advantage that aﬀects
the sectoral patterns of trade ﬂows.
Bernard, Redding and Schott (2005) have extended the Melitz (2003) model to accommodate
variable factor proportions, producing a richer model of trade in diﬀerentiated products than the
standard Helpman and Krugman (1985) version. They consider a two-sector two-factor world with
constant expenditure shares on each sector’s output, CES preferences for varieties in every sector,
and Cobb-Douglas production functions for activities that generate either ﬁxed or variable costs.
And they achieve great simplicity by assuming that the Cobb-Douglas production functions have
47The diﬀerences between Melitz (2003) and Melitz and Ottaviano (2005) stem from two sources: they use dif-
ferent shapes of demand functions (constant elasticity in one case and linear in the other) and they make diﬀerent
assumptions about the outside good (no outside good with constant marginal utility in one case and the presence of
such a good in the other). The absence of an outside good in Melitz (2003) generates impacts on input costs that
are absent in Melitz and Ottaviano (2005), where quasi linearity ﬁxes the unit cost c. But this is distinct from the
impacts of the shapes of the demand functions for ﬁnal goods, which are isoelastic in one case and linear in the other.
In the isoelastic case the demand level has no eﬀect on the cutoﬀ,b e c a u s ea n ys h i f ti nd e m a n di so ﬀset by entry, in
contrast to the case of linear demand. And while the markup is constant in the isoelastic case, it responds to demand
and entry in the linear case.
16the same exponents in all activities within a given sector, while they vary across sectors. In a
world with no trading frictions, i.e., neither ﬁxed nor variable costs of exporting, the analysis
proceeds along the now familiar lines of the integrated equilibrium approach, with results similar
to Helpman-Krugman. The sectoral cutoﬀs θD are not aﬀected by trade, and therefore neither
are sectoral productivity levels. The intersectoral pattern of trade is of the Heckscher-Ohlin type:
every country is a net exporter of goods that use relatively more intensively the input with which
the country is better endowed.48
Next they introduce melting iceberg variable trade costs and ﬁxed export costs, where the
sectoral ﬁxed export cost, arising from a Cobb-Douglas production function, has the same factor
intensity as the other sectoral activities. These costs segment markets across countries. Now
trade has an inﬂuence on the cutoﬀs θD; they rise in every country and every industry. This
means that trade raises average productivity everywhere in the world. Importantly, however, in
every country it raises average productivity proportionately more in the comparatively advantaged
industry, i.e., the sector that is relatively intensive in the input with which the country is relatively
well endowed. Under the circumstances, the Heckscher-Ohlin-type comparative advantage, which
emanates from factor composition, also produces Ricardian comparative advantage; and the two
forms of comparative advantage are positively correlated. This is an important result, because the
empirical evidence suggests that it is necessary to control for TFP diﬀerences across countries in
order to estimate the impact of factor proportions on trade ﬂows.49 In addition, trade increases
ﬁrm size, and relatively more so in sectors having comparative advantage. Finally, trade raises
the rate of gross job destruction and gross job creation, thereby raising turnover. But net job
creation rises in comparatively advantaged industries and declines in the other sectors. These are
very interesting predictions that will undoubtedly inﬂuence empirical analysis.
2.9 Gravity Equation of Trade Flows
The gravity equation is a major tool for the empirical analysis of trade ﬂows. It has been used to
study the impact on trade ﬂows of international borders, currency unions, membership in the WTO,
and other variables. And it has been used outside trade for instrumental variable estimation of the
impact of variables such as social infrastructure or political institutions on measures of economic
success.50 In all these applications the standard procedure is to estimate a gravity equation of
bilateral trade ﬂows on a sample of countries that export to each other. This selected sample of
countries represents, however, only about half of the country pairs in large samples of countries;
in the majority of the other half of country pairs, the countries do not trade with each other; and
in the remaining pairs, one country exports to the other but not vise versa.51 These facts raise
two questions: First, what accounts for the absence of trade among so many pairs of countries?
And second, to what extent are estimates of trade ﬂows that disregard the nontrading countries
48T h i sr e s u l td o e sn o th o l di naw o r l di nw h i c hd i ﬀerent activities within a sector have diﬀerent factor proportions.
49See Treﬂer (1995) and Davis and Weinstein (2001).
50See the discussion in Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2004).
51See Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2004).
17reliable?
Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2004) show that a modiﬁed version of Melitz (2003) can
account for the lack of trade between potential trading partners and that the modiﬁed theoretical
framework provides guidance for an estimation procedure that exploits the information contained
in the zero trade ﬂows. In particular, they argue that lack of trade is not random, but rather arises
from economic conditions, and that therefore we should simultaneously explain which countries
trade bilaterally and, amongst those that do, how much is traded. The model suggests that the
standard estimation procedure introduces two types of biases: a sample-selection bias and an
omitted-variable bias. The sample-selection bias problem is well known and it can be corrected for
with standard methods. The omitted-variable problem is novel, however. It stems from the fact
that, in addition to the intensive margin of trade, i.e., the response of a ﬁrm’s export to changing
conditions, there is an extensive margin, which consists of the response of the number of exporting
ﬁrms to changing conditions. If determinants of the number of exporting ﬁrms are not accounted
for in the estimation of trade ﬂows, the resulting estimates suﬀer from an omitted-variable bias.
Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein propose a method for decomposing the impact of covariates, such
as distance between countries, on trade ﬂows into an intensive and extensive margin, and they ﬁnd
that the extensive margin is empirically quite important.
The main ingredient of the modiﬁed model is a cumulative distribution function of productivity
θ that has ﬁnite support [θL,θH],w h e r eθL is the lowest productivity level and θH < ∞ is the
highest. It is evident from Figure 2 that if ΘH ≡ (θH)
ε−1 falls between the domestic cutoﬀ ΘD
and the export cutoﬀ Θ 
X,t h e nh o m eﬁrms produce for the home market but none of them ﬁnds it
proﬁt a b l et oe x p o r tt oc o u n t r y .M o r e o v e r ,ΘH c a nb eb e l o wt h ee x p o r tc u t o ﬀ of some countries
and above the export cutoﬀ of other countries, so that domestic ﬁrms may ﬁnd it proﬁtable to
export to some countries but not to others. The export cutoﬀ Θ 
X is smaller the larger is the
market in   and the lower are the ﬁxed export or trading costs with  . The variables that aﬀect
the cross-country variation in Θ 
X therefore explain to which foreign countries the home country
should export.
Using the ﬁrms’ optimal pricing and sales strategies together with the free-entry condition,
the model implies two equations for every export ﬂow, say from country j to country i.O n e
equation describes the log of exports from country j to country i, mij, as a function of standard
covariates, such as distance between the countries and whether they share a common language, as
well as exporter and importer ﬁxed eﬀects. But in addition, it includes a variable wij which is an
increasing function of the fraction of country j ﬁr m st h a te x p o r tt oc o u n t r yi:
mij = β0 + λj + χi − γdij + wij + uij.
In this equation λj is country j’s ﬁxed eﬀect as an exporter, χi is country i’s ﬁxed eﬀect as an
importer, dij is the distance between the two countries and uij is an error term that describes the
unobserved variation across country pairs in variable trade costs.52 Covariates other than distance
52The need for separate importer and exporter ﬁxed eﬀects has been well known; see, for example, Feenstra (2003).
18are accommodated in similar fashion. The second equation describes a latent variable that is
p o s i t i v ei fa n do n l yi fj exports to i.I ti sd e ﬁned as the log of the ratio of variable export proﬁts
for the most productive ﬁrm to the ﬁxed export cost, where the latter is the same for all ﬁrms in j.
When this latent variable, zij, exceeds zero, some ﬁrms from country j export to country i, because
the most productive ﬁrm makes proﬁts large enough to cover the ﬁxed export cost. The resulting
equation is
zij = γ0 + ξj + ζi − γdij − κφij + ηij,
where ξj is an exporter ﬁxed eﬀect, ζi is an importer ﬁxed eﬀect, φij is an observed variable
that impacts the ﬁxed cost of exporting from j to i,a n dηij is an error term that combines the
unobserved variation across countries in variable trade costs uij (which also appears in the trade
ﬂow equation) and a variable vij that represents unobserved variation across countries in the ﬁxed
export costs. Evidently, ηij is correlated with uij.
It is common to estimate the equation of trade ﬂows mij for country pairs with positive trade
ﬂows, without controlling for the impact of the fraction of exporting ﬁrms through wij.T h e s ea r e
the sources of the selection and omitted-variable biases. Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2004)
show how to use standard methods to correct for the sample selection bias, by estimating the
equation for zij and the equation for mij. This bias turns out to be rather small in their data.
In addition, they show how to account for the impact of wij on the trade ﬂows. Their procedure
recognizes the fact that no data on wij are available, nor are there data on the fraction of exporting
ﬁrms, a variable that impacts wij.53 In particular, they show that the estimated (selection) equation
for zij can be used to construct estimates of the wijs, which can then be used in the estimation
of the trade ﬂow equation. In this way one can separately identify the impact of a variable, such
as distance dij, on the intensive margin (via its direct impact on mij) and the extensive margin
(via its impact on mij through wij). The theoretical underpinning of this procedure derives from
the fact that ﬁxed costs aﬀect the latent variable zij directly, but aﬀect the trade ﬂow mij only
indirectly via their impact on the fraction of exporting ﬁrms.
It should be evident from this section that productivity diﬀerences across ﬁr m si na ni n d u s t r y
have important implications for trade, trade policies, and FDI ﬂows. Not only does this new way
of thinking shed light on a host of substantive issues, it also helps in formulating better empirical
strategies for estimating trade ﬂows. To illustrate, this approach suggests that countries seeking to
integrate into the world trading system or to join a free trade area should expect substantial
reallocations across ﬁrms within industries, which will impact sectoral productivity levels. In
addition to rasing the proﬁts of exporting ﬁrms, lower protection raises the competitive pressure
from foreign enterprises, which cuts into the domestic ﬁrms’ markups, raises domestic factor costs,
and drives the country’s least-productivity ﬁrms out of business.
The theoretical model provides, however, a clear interpretation of the determinants of these ﬁxed eﬀects.
53That is, there are no data on the fraction of exporting ﬁrms for the large samples of countries used to estimate
gravity equations. Note also that even if data on wij were available, it could not be used directly because wij is an
endogenous variable, and one would therefore need to instrument it.
193 Incomplete Contracts
My discussion of trade and FDI has so far focused on ﬁnal products.54 Importantly, none of the
studies reviewed in the previous section, where ﬁrms make FDI choices, explicitly analyzes the
internalization decision. That is, it is assumed that foreign operations are organized in foreign
aﬃliates, be it for the purpose of manufacturing ﬁnal products designated for the foreign market,
m a n u f a c t u r i n gc o m p o n e n t si naf o r e i g nc o u n t r yt ob ea s s e m b l e da th o m eo ri naf o r e i g nc o u n t r y ,
or assembling ﬁnal goods to be sold in the home or foreign market. Yet the choice of whether to
manufacture components inhouse or acquire them from an unaﬃliated ﬁrm is a key decision about
organizational form, as is the decision of whether to source such components at home or in a foreign
country. The same applies to assembly, which is just another activity in the chain of tasks that
need to be performed in order to deliver a product to a ﬁnal user. A better understanding of these
choices is needed in order to explain the trends in trade and FDI and their relation to the evolving
organization of production and distribution.
Two facts stand out that triggered a major research eﬀort into the international organization
of production. First, with the advent of computer-aided design, computer-aided manufacturing,
and institutional changes in labor markets, outsourcing has rapidly expanded.55 This is true about
both domestic and international outsourcing, where rising domestic outsourcing means an increase
in the purchase of intermediate goods and services from domestic unaﬃliated ﬁrms, and rising
foreign outsourcing means an increase in the purchase of intermediate goods and services from
foreign unaﬃliated ﬁrms. These trends have been widespread across diﬀerent sectors and diﬀerent
inputs.56 Second, the sourcing of inputs from foreign countries has increased at a rapid pace,
both via arm’s-length trade (outsourcing) and via intraﬁrm trade (FDI), a phenomenon known
as oﬀshoring.57 In order to understand these trends, we need to understand the two-dimensional
decision problem of business ﬁrms: whether to outsource or insource (i.e., integrate), and whether
to oﬀshore or not.58 This choice yields four possibilities: insourcing at home, outsourcing at home,
54The only exception being the discussion of the interrelationship between FDI in components and FDI in assembly
in Section 2.6.
55I use "outsourcing" to mean the acquisition of an input or service from an unaﬃliated company. This is the
standard terminology used in industrial organization. A narrower deﬁnition is used in some of the literature, e.g.,
Amiti and Wei (2005). A notable example of a very narrow deﬁnition is Bhagwati, Panagariya and Srinivasan (2005),
who restrict the term to outsourcing of services from foreign unaﬃliated companies. I ﬁnd it preferable to use the
traditional deﬁnition.
56See Bardi and Tracey (1991), Gardner (1991), Helper (1991), Bamford (1994), Abraham and Taylor (1996) and
Bartel, Lach and Sicherman (2005) for evidence on the growth of outsourcing in various industries. The Economist
(1991) provides an early overview.
57Feenstra and Hanson (1996) ﬁnd more than a doubling of the share of imports in total purchases of intermediates
from 1972 to 1990 in the U.S. (from 5.0% to 11.6%), while Campa and Goldberg (1997) ﬁnd similar trends in Canada
and the U.K. And Hummels, Ishii and Yi (2001) and Yeats (2001) ﬁnd that foreign trade in components has grown
faster than foreign trade in ﬁnal goods. Finally, Hanson, Mataloni and Slaughter (2004) ﬁnd that intraﬁrm trade
within U.S. multinationals has grown very fast, although somewhat less than international outsourcing by U.S. ﬁrms,
and Feinberg and Keane (2005) report that sales of U.S. parent ﬁr m st ot h e i rC a n a d i a na ﬃliates as a fraction of the
aﬃliates’ total sales, as well as sales of the Canadian aﬃl i a t e st ot h e i rU . S .p a r e n t sa saf r a c t i o no ft h ep a r e n t s ’t o t a l
sales, have almost doubled between 1984 and 1995.
58Two additional decisions, which are equally important but received only scant attention, concern the types of
inputs that should be acquired by means of each one of these organizational forms, and if an input is to be sourced
20insourcing abroad (FDI), and outsourcing abroad. The ﬁrst two organizational forms do not involve
foreign trade, while the latter two do: intraﬁrm trade in the case of FDI, and arm’s-length trade
in the case of outsourcing.59
An analysis of these issues by means of the incomplete contracts approach to the theory of
the ﬁrm helps in understanding why some companies source inputs abroad primarily via FDI, and
while other companies source them abroad primarily via outsourcing. It also helps in understanding
why intra-ﬁrm trade as a fraction of total trade is positively correlated with capital-labor ratios
across U.S. industries and capital-labor ratios across countries from which the U.S. imports (see
Antràs (2003)). Moreover, this approach helps in understanding why diﬀerences across countries
in the quality of legal systems generate comparative advantage, and thereby impact the patterns of
trade (see Levchenko (2004) and Nunn (2005)). Finally, when combined with productivity variation
across ﬁrms within industries, this approach helps in predicting the relative prevalence of alternative
forms of the international organization of production as a function of sectoral characteristics and
diﬀerences in features of the trading partners.
3.1 The Incomplete Contracts Approach
To illustrate the incomplete contracts approach to the theory of the ﬁrm, consider the following
example.60 A ﬁnal good producer makes proﬁts π0 ≥ 0 if she does not use a specialized intermediate
input. If, however, she uses one unit of the specialized intermediate input, her proﬁts become
π1 >π 0,w h e r eπ1 does not include the cost of the input to the ﬁnal good producer. For simplicity,
assume that the ﬁnal good producer can use only one unit of this input.
In order to acquire the input, the ﬁnal good producer needs to engage a supplier. The supplier
can produce the required input at cost c. Importantly, however, the ﬁnal good producer and the
supplier cannot sign an enforceable contract that speciﬁes the nature of the specialized intermediate
input, but the ﬁnal good producer can recognize ex post, after the input is delivered, whether the
input has the requisite features. For this reason the supplier can choose the characteristics of
the input, and when delivering it to the ﬁnal good producer he can bargain with the ﬁnal good
producer for payment. At the bargaining stage the cost c of the intermediate input is sunk, and it
therefore plays no role in determining the bargaining outcome. But it does play an important role
in determining whether the supplier chooses to manufacture the requisite intermediate input in the
ﬁrst place.
There are two stages to the game. In the ﬁrst stage the supplier decides whether to manufacture
the intermediate input, and if he does, whether to endow the input with the special characteristics
requested by the ﬁnal good producer. In stage two the supplier delivers the input and bargains for
aboard, to which country it should be oﬀshored.
59The segmentation of production across diﬀerent countries has become so large, that it prompted the WTO to
describe in its 1998 annual report the detailed acquisition of inputs by U.S. car manufacturers in diﬀerent countries,
concluding that only 37% of a car’s value was generated in the U.S. Tempest (1996) describes an equally global
sourcing strategy of Mattel in the manufacturing of Barbie dolls (see Feenstra (1998)).
60See Hart (1995) for a detailed discussion of this approach, and Bolton and Dewatripont (2005) for a textbook
treatment.
21payment. As usual, the game is solved backwards, starting from stage two.
Assume that whenever the ﬁnal good producer and the supplier bargain they reach an agreement
according to the Nash bargaining solution, with the bargaining weight β ∈ (0,1) for the ﬁnal good
producer and 1 − β for the supplier. In this event their payoﬀs are derived as follows. In case of
a breakup of the negotiation, the ﬁnal good producer has the outside option π0 while the supplier
has the outside option σ0 ≥ 0.T h es i z eo fσ0 depends on how specialized the intermediate input is.
If, for example, it is so highly specialized that no one else can use it, i.e., it has no value outside the
relationship, then σ0 =0 . If, however, the intermediate input can be used by other manufacturers,
then σ0 > 0.I ne i t h e rc a s e ,t h ep a y o ﬀ of the supplier equals his outside option plus the share 1−β
of the surplus from the relationship, while the payoﬀ of the ﬁnal good producer equals her outside
option π0 plus the share β of the surplus from the relationship. The size of the surplus depends on
whether the intermediate input satisﬁes the speciﬁcations needed by the ﬁnal good. If it does, the
surplus equals π1 minus the outside options of the two players; that is, it equals π1 −π0 −σ0.I fi t
does not, it equals −π0 − σ0, because the input adds no value to the relationship. Naturally, the
latter case does not arise in equilibrium. Therefore in an equilibrium in which the supplier delivers
the requisite input the payoﬀs from the bargaining game are
Pf = π0 + β (π1 − π0 − σ0)
for the ﬁnal good producer and
Ps = σ0 +( 1− β)(π1 − π0 − σ0)
for the supplier. Note that Pf + Ps = π1, so that they split the proﬁts π1. We can interpret Ps
as the payment of the ﬁnal good producer to the supplier for the intermediate input, so that her
proﬁts net of the input cost, π1 − Ps,e q u a lh e rp a y o ﬀ Pf.
This solution to the bargaining game determines the incentives of the supplier to engage in
a business relationship with the ﬁnal good producer (in stage one of the game). If Ps ≥ c,t h i s
relationship generates a proﬁt a b l ed e a l ;o t h e r w i s ei td o e sn o t .T h a ti s ,i nc a s ePs <cthe supplier
will not produce the specialized intermediate input.
In this example there is a one-sided holdup problem. The supplier is held up by the ﬁnal good
producer, because he makes a relationship-speciﬁc investment. More generally, however, the ﬁnal
good producer may also be required to make a relationship-speciﬁc investment, in which case there
will be a two-sided holdup problem. Moreover, the outside options of the two parties may depend
on the organizational form of the business ﬁrm, e.g., whether the intermediate input is produced
inhouse or outsourced. In the former case the supplier is an employee of the ﬁnal good producer
while in the latter case he is not (see Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart (1995)). Finally, when
these interactions are placed in a general equilibrium setup, the outside options become endogenous,
and they depend on the nature of the technology and the organization of the industry (see Grossman
and Helpman (2002)).
22I now turn to the application of this approach to the main issues discussed in the preamble to
this section. I have ordered the topics in a way that eases the exposition, and not in the order in
which they appeared in the literature.
3.2 Contractual Input Intensity
Traditionally, input (or factor) intensity refers to the relative requirement of various inputs (or
factors of production) in the manufacturing of a good. But the theory of incomplete contracts
identiﬁes another important measure of input intensity: the relative requirement of intermediate
inputs that are under direct control of the ﬁnal good producer, and intermediate inputs that require
the engagement of suppliers. The importance of the second intensity measure, which I term the
contractual input intensity, stems from the fact that intermediate inputs under the direct control
of the ﬁnal good producer suﬀer less form agency problems than intermediate inputs that require
the engagement of suppliers. Naturally, the two intensity measures can be correlated. And when
they are, the theory yields interesting predictions about the structure of trade.
The contractual input intensity impacts the power of incentives that a ﬁnal good producer wants
to give a supplier. In particular, the more intensive the production process is in intermediate inputs
that are controlled by suppliers, the more powerful incentives she wants to give the suppliers. Yet
her most desired incentives are not extreme. That is, she never wants to give them the strongest
possible or the weakest possible incentives. Under the circumstances her choice of organizational
form, such as outsourcing versus integration, is determined to an important degree by its eﬀect on
the incentives of suppliers.
To understand the role played by contractual input intensity, consider an industry of a diﬀer-
entiated product in which the demand function is, as before, x(j)=Ap(j)
−ε, ε =1 /(1 − α) > 0.
Now, however, the production of brand j requires two customized inputs, headquarter services h(j)
and components m(j). These intermediate inputs are combined via a Cobb-Douglas production
function to produce either brand j of the diﬀerentiated product, x(j), or another intermediate
input of type j,s a yy(j), which is used to assemble x(j). In the latter case x(j)=y(j).61 I









, 0 <η<1,( 6 )
where z is either x or y, θ represents productivity, which for the time being is the same for all ﬁrms
in the industry, and η measures contractual input intensity. The larger η i st h em o r ei n t e n s i v et h e
sector is in headquarter services (but η does not vary across ﬁrms in the industry). The critical
assumption is that h has to be supplied by the ﬁnal good producer while m requires the engagement
of a supplier, which can take place either inside or outside the ﬁrm. But in either case the supplier
controls m. In this event the internalization decision is only about the intermediate input m,n o t
61These two possibilities may seem to be an unnecessary complication at this stage, but they provide a uniﬁed
treatment of distinct papers in the literature, as will become clear below.
23about h. In a simple version of the model there is only labor and both h and m are produced with
a ﬁxed amount of labor per unit output. More generally, there can be many factors of production
(primary inputs), and h and m may be produced with diﬀerent factor proportions. It then follows
that the overall factor intensity of and industry is jointly determined by its contractual input
intensity and by the factor intensities of headquarter services and components.
Using the demand function x(j)=Ap(j)
−ε and the production function (6), we can calculate
revenue as a function of the inputs h and m,s a yR[h(j),m(j)]. The assumption is that the ﬁnal
good producer bears directly the cost of headquarter services and decides the level of h,w h i l et h e
supplier, who may be working for the ﬁnal good producer or be independent, chooses m.G r e a t
simpliﬁcation is attained by assuming that the ﬁnal good producer can obtain as many suppliers as
she wants by oﬀering a reward structure consisting of an upfront payment and a share of the proﬁts
at the bargaining stage. In this event competition among suppliers leaves them with no rents, and
a supplier’s total net income (net of input cost) equals his opportunity cost. At the bargaining
stage the distribution of revenue R[h(j),m(j)] depends on the bargaining weights, which are β
for the ﬁnal good producer and 1 − β for the intermediate good producer, and on organizational
form, which determines every party’s outside option.
Consider outsourcing. Under this organizational form the outside options at the bargaining
stage are zero for both parties, because one party owns h and the other owns m, and both inputs
have been customized for product j to a degree that they have no value outside the relationship.62
As a result, the ﬁnal good producer receives the fraction β of the revenue while the supplier receives
the fraction 1 − β.
Next consider integration. Now both h and m belong to the ﬁnal good producer, because the
supplier is her employee. But, following Grossman and Hart (1986), assume that if the bargaining
fails and the supplier does not cooperate, then the ﬁnal good producer cannot deploy the inputs
as eﬀectively as she can if the supplier cooperates. In particular, without the cooperation of the
supplier she is able to produce only a fraction δ of the output in (6). Under the circumstances the
outside option of the supplier at the bargaining stage is zero, while the outside option of the ﬁnal
good producer is fraction δα of the revenue R[h(j),m(j)].63 As a result, in the bargaining stage
62The outside options need not be zero in this case. For example, the ﬁnal good producer may have the option
of using a generic intermediate input m instead of the specialized variety, in which case her outside option will not
be zero. Similarly, the intermediate good producer may have the option of selling the input m(j) to another ﬁrm,
which will provide it with a positive outside option. Grossman and Helpman (2002) provide an analysis in which the
suitability of a component m to a ﬁnal good producer is measured by the distance between the supplier and the ﬁnal
good producer in technology space, and suppliers have the option to choose the location of their intermediate inputs
in this space. When bargaining breaks down, ﬁnal good producers and component suppliers enter a secondary market.
The secondary market equilibrium then determines the outside options in the primary market. In the Grossman and
Helpman technology space a generic input is deﬁned as the input that is equal-distant from all ﬁnal goods. Feenstra
and Spencer (2005) also develop a model of contracting in the presence of generic inputs, and they use it to analyze
the organization of Chinese suppliers. The model discussed in the text focuses on the simpler case of zero outside
options.
63The ﬁnding that the outside option of the ﬁnal good producer under integration is the fraction δ
α of revenue
rather than the fraction δ stems from the concavity of the revenue function in the quantity sold. That is, revenue as
a function of the quantity x is proportional to x
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Figure 5: Optimal Bargaining Share
the ﬁnal good producer receives a fraction βV = δα+β (1 − δα) of the revenue R[h(j),m(j)],a n d
the supplier receives a fraction 1 − βV .
An important tradeoﬀ in the choice of organizational form by the ﬁnal good producer is derived
from a comparison of the distribution shares of revenue, R[h(j),m(j)], with the shares that arise
under outsourcing and integration. Let β∗ be the ﬁnal good producer’s most preferred share, which
maximizes her proﬁts. First note that it cannot be zero, because if it were zero she would have no
incentive to provide headquarter services, and in the absence of h, revenue equals zero. Second,
note that it cannot be one, because if it were one the supplier would have no incentive to provide
components, and in the absence of m, revenue would equal zero. Evidently, β∗ is strictly positive
and strictly smaller than one. Moreover, it can be shown that β∗ is an increasing function of the
intensity of headquarter services, as measured by η. The shape of the relationship between β∗ and
η is depicted in Figure 5. β∗ equals zero when η =0 ,i te q u a l so n ew h e nη =1 ,a n di tr i s e si n
between. Moreover, it is concave for low values of η and convex for high values.
The ﬁgure also shows the distribution of revenue shares under outsourcing and integration, β
and βV , respectively; they are above the optimal share β∗ when an industry is component-intensive,
so that η is small (such as ηM) ,a n dt h e ya r eb e l o wβ∗ when an industry is headquarter-intensive,
so that η is large (such as ηH). The arrows show the direction of rising proﬁts; that is, proﬁts
rise when the ﬁnal good producer’s share shifts vertically toward β∗. This characterization implies
that there exists a cutoﬀ ηc –n o td r a w ni nt h eﬁgure – with ηM <η c <η H, such that the
ﬁnal good producer has higher proﬁts from outsourcing when η is below ηc and higher proﬁts from
integration when η is above ηc. It follows that, based on the power of incentives consideration
alone, ﬁnal good producers prefer outsourcing in component-intensive industries and integration in
25headquarter-intensive industries. However, the ﬁnal verdict on whether to outsource or integrate
does not depend on these considerations alone if there also exist cost diﬀerences in running ﬁrms
with diﬀerent organizational forms.64
Antràs (2003) uses a variant of this model in which there are no organization-speciﬁcc o s t s ;t h e r e
are ﬁxed entry costs, but these costs are independent of whether the ﬁrm chooses to outsource or
integrate. In this event the power of incentives dominates the integration decision. That is, given
the headquarter intensity measure η a ﬁrm prefers integration if η>η c and outsourcing if η<η c.
He assumes that h is capital-intensive and m is labor-intensive, and that h and m are not tradeable
across borders. In this event every ﬁnal good producer has to deploy h and m i nt h es a m ec o u n t r y .
Moreover, these inputs are used to manufacture an intermediate input y t h a tc a nb ef r e e l ys h i p p e d
across borders. The production function is given by (6), where z = y.T h eﬁnal good x is produced
from y in the destination country with one unit of y per unit x. Finally, consumers spend ﬁxed
budget shares on goods in every sector and they have CES preferences across brands.
In a two-country two-sector version of this model, trade structure can be derived from the inte-
grated equilibrium, similarly to Helpman and Krugman’s (1985) analysis of trade in diﬀerentiated
products. Assuming that one sector has η above the cutoﬀ ηc and another sector has η below
this cutoﬀ implies that ﬁrms are integrated in the former sector and ﬁrms outsource in the latter
sector. Moreover, since h is capital intensive while m is labor intensive, the sector with integrated
ﬁrms is capital intensive and the sector with outsourcing ﬁrms is labor intensive. As a result, there
is intra-ﬁrm trade in the tradeable intermediate inputs in the capital-intensive sector and arm’s-
length trade in tradeable intermediate inputs in the labor-intensive sector. This implies a positive
correlation between capital intensity and the share of intraﬁrm trade. A multicountry version of
this model also implies a positive correlation between the share of intraﬁrm imports and the capital
abundance of the exporting country. Antràs (2003) provides evidence supporting these predictions.
In U.S. data, intraﬁrm imports as a fraction of total imports are positively correlated with the
capital intensity across 23 manufacturing industries, and intraﬁrm imports as a fraction of total
imports are positively correlated with capital abundance across 28 exporting countries.
Antràs (2005) applies a one-factor variant of this model to product cycles. The two countries
are North and South. He assumes that both headquarter services and ﬁnal goods can be produced
only in North. In addition to whether to integrate or outsource, however, a ﬁnal good producer
has to decide in which country to source the component m, i.e., whether to oﬀshore m or not.
Integration or outsourcing in North imply no trade in components, integration in South implies
64Feenstra and Hanson (2005) estimate a related model of the ﬁrm from Chinese export-processing data. A plant
that processes imported inputs for sales to a foreign ﬁrm can be owned either by a foreign ﬁrm or by a Chinese entity.
Similarly, imported inputs for further processing can be owned by a foreign ﬁrm or by the processing plant. In the
latter case the inputs are controlled by the plant’s manager. The organizational form, which consists of the ownership
of the plant and the ownership of the imported inputs, is determined according to the property rights approach, as
in the model described in the text. Feenstra and Hanson ﬁnd that the prevalence of alternative organizational
forms varies across Chinese regions in accordance with the model’s prediction. This is a good case study, because
55.6% of Chinese exports during the sample period, 1997 to 2002, are of this nature (i.e., export-processing), and
the distribution of export-processing exports into the four organizational forms has a nonnegligible fraction in every
regime.
26intraﬁrm trade, and outsourcing in South implies arm’s-length trade in components. Contracts
are complete in North but incomplete in South. That is, the two countries diﬀer in the degree of
contract incompleteness.
T h em a i nr e s u l ti st h a tt h e r ee x i s tt w oc u t o ﬀ values of the contractual input intensity measure
η, ηc and ηn >η c, which determine the desired organizational form. When headquarter intensity
is above the upper threshold ηn, ﬁnal good producers source m in North (the model is silent on
whether they outsource or integrate there, because contracts are complete in North). For values
between ηc and ηn, ﬁnal good producers invest in subsidiaries in South and source m from their
aﬃliates in South. And when headquarter intensity is below the lower cutoﬀ ηc ﬁnal good producers
outsource in South. Interpreting η as a feature of technology that changes over time – so that η
is high for a new product and it declines over time as experience in production is gained – these
results imply a product cycle of the Vernon (1966) type: all parts of the value chain of a new
product are produced in North, over time the production of components is shifted to subsidiaries
in South, and as the product matures, the components are outsourced to Southern manufacturers.
3.3 Contractual Input Intensity and Productivity Heterogeneity
A combination of variation in contractual input intensity across sectors and variation in produc-
tivity across ﬁrms within industries generates equilibria in which all four organizational forms –
insourcing at home, outsourcing at home, insourcing abroad, and outsourcing abroad – coex-
ist in an industry and their relative prevalence varies across industries as a function of sectoral
characteristics. Note that these four organizational forms do not coexist in the previous models.
Following Antràs and Helpman (2004), assume that the production function (6) applies to a
typical industry, but that the productivity level θ varies across ﬁrms. As in Melitz (2003), an
entrant into the industry obtains a productivity draw θ after sinking the entry cost. After entry,
and knowing her productivity, the ﬁnal good producer has to decide on her organizational form.
There are two countries, North and South, with the wage rate in North exceeding the wage rate
in South. Labor is the only primary input. All ﬁnal good producers are located in North, where
they also produce headquarter services h. The intermediate inputs m can be produced either in
North or South with the same labor input per unit output. This makes the variable costs of m
lower in South. But there are diﬀerent ﬁxed costs of sourcing in North and South, and these ﬁxed
costs also diﬀer for outsourcing and integration. In particular, Antràs and Helpman (2004) focus
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V is the ﬁxed cost of integration in South (FDI), fS
O is
the ﬁxed cost of outsourcing in South, fN
V is the ﬁxed cost of integration in North, and fN
O is the
ﬁxed cost of outsourcing in North, all measured in terms of Northern labor.65
Under these circumstances outsourcing dominates integration in component-intensive industries,
because (i) outsourcing has lower ﬁxed cost; and (ii) for low values of η outsourcing provides better
incentives to suppliers of intermediate input m (see Figure 5). It follows that in component-
65They also provide a brief discussion of the implications of other orderings of ﬁxed costs. See also Grossman,













Figure 6: Importing and nonimporting ﬁrms in a component-intensive sector
intensive industries all ﬁrms outsource, and the only remaining tradeoﬀ is between domestic and
foreign outsourcing. In the oﬀshoring decision, the tradeoﬀ is between lower variable cost in South
and lower ﬁxed cost in North. This tradeoﬀ is depicted in Figure 6, where πS
O represents proﬁts
from outsourcing in South and πN
O represents proﬁts from outsourcing in North as a function of
the productivity measure Θ ≡ θε−1. The proﬁtl i n eπS
O is steeper because variable costs are lower
in South. Evidently, ﬁrms with productivity below ΘD exit the industry, high-productivity ﬁrms
–w i t hΘ above ΘM – import components from unaﬃliated producers in South, and ﬁrms with
productivity between ΘD and ΘM acquire components from unaﬃliated ﬁrms in North. That
is, among the active ﬁrms low-productivity ﬁrms outsource at home and high-productivity ﬁrms
outsource abroad.
A similar analysis of a headquarter-intensive sector shows that all four organizational forms
can coexist. The tradeoﬀ between outsourcing and integration in North is depicted in Figure 7,
where πN
V represents the proﬁts of an integrated producer and πN
O represents the proﬁts of an
outsourcing producer. The proﬁtl i n eπN
V is steeper because integration in a headquarter-intensive
sector provides better incentives to suppliers of parts (see Figure 5). In this case low-productivity
ﬁrms – with Θ below ΘD – exit the industry; high-productivity ﬁrms – with Θ above ΘO –
integrate; and ﬁrms with intermediate productivity levels outsource. Combining this analysis with
a similar analysis of the tradeoﬀ between outsourcing and integration in South, and accounting for
t h ef a c tt h a to ﬀshoring has an advantage in terms of variable costs but a disadvantage in terms of
ﬁxed costs, we obtain the sorting pattern depicted in Figure 8. That is, the least-productive ﬁrms
exit the industry while the most-productive ﬁrms use FDI to produce intermediate inputs in South.


























Figure 8: Sorting pattern in a headquarter-intensive sector
29South, and ﬁrms with intermediate productivity levels integrate in North.
Three interesting results emerge from a comparative statics analysis of this model. First,
oﬀshoring declines with headquarter intensity η. Second, more productivity dispersion leads to
more oﬀshoring;66 in component-intensive sectors it leads to more outsourcing in South while in
headquarter-intensive sectors it leads to more integration plus outsourcing in South. In addition, in
headquarter intensive sectors, where there is both outsourcing and integration, more productivity
dispersion leads to more integration and less outsourcing. These predictions apply to variations
across industries; e.g., the model predicts more oﬀshoring in sectors with higher component in-
tensity and sectors with more productivity dispersion. Third, an improvement in the competitive
advantage of South, be it as a result of declining relative wages or declining protection in North,
raises oﬀshoring in all sectors; and in headquarter-intensive sectors, outsourcing of components
from foreign suppliers rises proportionately more than purchases of intermediate inputs from for-
eign aﬃliates.67
3.4 Matching and Thick Market Eﬀects
In the previous models ﬁnal good producers could attract suitable suppliers at will, as long as the
suppliers could gain from the relationship with a ﬁnal good producer as much as they expected to
gain from alternative activities. In other words, there was an inﬁnitely elastic supply of component
producers. This, of course, is not entirely realistic, because matching between buyers and sellers
is a complex process that involves risks on both sides. In particular, the quality of a match with
a supplier that a ﬁnal good producer can expect when she outsources depends on the number
of potential suppliers in the market, and on their expertise, i.e., whether their knowledge and
experience are suitable for the manufacturing of the type of intermediate inputs required by her
brand.
One simple approach, which places matching between buyers and sellers of intermediate inputs
at the heart of the analysis, has been developed by McLaren (2000) and Grossman and Helpman
(2002). In this approach potential buyers of an intermediate input ﬁnd it more attractive to
outsource the "thicker" the market for the input is, in the sense that there exist more sellers to
serve the buyers’ needs. And similarly, sellers of an intermediate input ﬁnd it more attractive to
operate the larger the number of potential buyers is. Although there can be more than one reason
for this type of market externality, both papers use an endogenous probability of successful matching
between buyers and sellers as the main driving force of this process. In this type of environment
international trade (or ‘globalization,’ using McLaren’s terminology) aﬀects the tradeoﬀ between
outsourcing and integration. In particular, in the presence of economies of scale to matching, trade
66Productivity dispersion is measured by the shape parameter of the Pareto distribution.
67Grossman, Helpman and Szeidl (2005a) use a variant of this model to examine the complementarity between
outsourcing and oﬀshoring. In their model, the fraction of oﬀshoring ﬁrms is larger the smaller the ﬁxed cost of
outsourcing. This is the sense in which oﬀshoring is complementary to outsourcing; as the ﬁxed cost of outsourcing
changes, it generates a positive correlation between the fraction of ﬁrms that outsource and the fraction of ﬁrms that
oﬀshore.
30encourages outsourcing.
Since Grossman and Helpman’s (2002) analysis is closer in form to what we have seen in previous
sections, and they also show how to deal with these issues in general equilibrium, I will use their
framework to illustrate this approach. To this end, consider an industry supplying a diﬀerentiated
product, in which the demand for variety j is, as before, x(j)=Ap(j)
−ε,w h e r eε =1 /(1 − α) > 1
(i.e., 0 <α<1). Now assume that in order to produce brand j the manufacturer of the ﬁnal good
needs to acquire an input that is highly speciﬁc to this brand. As before, assume that the input
has to be tailor-made for brand j, and once it has been tailor-made for j it cannot be used for
any other brand, nor can it be put to any other use. For simplicity, assume that one unit of the
intermediate input is needed per unit of ﬁnal good and that no other inputs are required.68
First consider a closed economy in which the producer of brand j has two organizational options:
she can produce the intermediate good inhouse or outsource. If she produces inhouse, she needs
1/θ > 1 units of labor for every unit of the tailor-made intermediate input, where θ is a measure
of productivity, common to all ﬁrms. In addition, she has to bear a ﬁxed labor cost fV ,w h i c h
includes her entry cost (the entry cost covers the acquisition of the technology, the cost of setting
up shop, and the like). After entry, her optimal pricing strategy generates a proﬁt level πV (A)
which is increasing in the demand level A. It follows that integration is viable in a free entry
equilibrium if and only if the demand level equals AV , at which the integrated ﬁrm breaks even;
that is, πV (AV )=0 . Obviously, the demand level cannot be higher than AV , because this would
induce entry of additional integrated ﬁnal good producers, and if it were lower than AV no ﬁnal
good producer would choose to integrate.
Next consider a ﬁnal good producer who chooses to outsource. For this she needs to be matched
with a supplier of the intermediate input, because inputs with her specialized needs are not readily
available in the market. It is assumed that once she is matched with a supplier, they cannot sign
a contract for the delivery of the brand-speciﬁc intermediate input. In this event there exists a
holdup problem; the supplier can choose how much of the input to produce, but then he has to
bargain with the ﬁnal good producer for payment. A specialized supplier of inputs can produce
them with one unit of labor per unit output, which gives him a cost advantage over the integrated
ﬁrm (which needs 1/θ > 1 units of labor per unit output). In the ensuing Nash bargaining both
parties have zero outside options and the ﬁnal good producer gets a fraction β of the surplus.
Evidently, the distribution of the bargaining power between the two parties aﬀects payoﬀs. Using
these payoﬀs it is then possible to calculate the expected proﬁts of a ﬁnal good entrant who plans
to outsource and the expected proﬁts of an intermediate good producer. These expected proﬁts
depend on the probabilities of being matched and on entry costs, in addition to the payoﬀsa tt h e
bargaining stage.
Let µ(N,M) be the matching function, which describes the number of matches that take place
68This is a special case of the production function (6), with η =0 . It implies that all else equal, the ﬁnal good
producer would like to give the supplier the most powerful incentives possible. As noted in footnote 62, Grossman
and Helpman (2002) also develop a richer analysis in which the quality of a match depends on the distance between
the ﬁnal good producer and the supplier in technology space.
31in a market with N outsourcing ﬁnal good producers and M producers of intermediate inputs.
This function is increasing in both arguments and µ(N,M) ≤ min{N,M}. Then the probability
of a ﬁnal good producer being matched is µ(N,M)/N and the probability of an intermediate good
producer being matched is µ(N,M)/M. Once a supplier and a ﬁnal good producer have been
matched, the supplier manufactures an intermediate input tailored to the speciﬁc needs of the ﬁnal
good producer. In this model all suppliers are equally capable of manufacturing every such input.
I discuss asymmetries in the qualiﬁcations of suppliers below.
When the matching function exhibits constant returns to scale µ(N,M)/N = µ(1,M/ N) and
µ(N,M)/M = µ(N/M,1). We can then use the entry costs of ﬁnal and intermediate good produc-
ers to formulate two free entry conditions: the expected proﬁts (before entry) of an outsourcing ﬁnal
good producer equal her entry cost as an outsourcing enterprise, and the expected proﬁts (before
entry) of an intermediate good producer equal his entry cost. These expected proﬁts are functions
of the demand level A and the ratio of entrants M/N,t h a ti s ,πN (A,M/N) and πM (A,M/N).
Both expected proﬁts are rising in A, but the ﬁnal good producer’s proﬁts πN (A,M/N) are rising
in M/N while the intermediate good producer’s proﬁts πM (A,M/N) are declining in M/N. Hence,
there is complementarity between entry of intermediate good producers and entry of outsourcing-
oriented ﬁnal good producers. Other things equal, an increase in M raises the expected proﬁts
of ﬁnal good producers while an increase in N raises the expected proﬁts of intermediate good
producers. It follows that more entry of one type encourages more entry of the other type.
Viability of outsourcing in the resulting equilibrium requires zero expected proﬁts for both ﬁnal
and intermediate good producers; that is, πN (A,M/N)=0and πM (A,M/N)=0 .T h et w of r e e
entry conditions are satisﬁed for unique values of the demand level and the ratio of entrants, say
AO and rO = MO/NO.
Grossman and Helpman (2002) show that an equilibrium with integrated ﬁrms only always
exists, but that it is not stable unless AV <A O. Namely, stability requires the demand level that
ensures zero proﬁts of integrated ﬁrms to be lower than the demand level that ensures zero proﬁts of
outsourcing ﬁnal good producers and their suppliers of parts. The reason that an equilibrium with
integrated ﬁrms only always exists is that, in the absence of suppliers of intermediate inputs, the
ﬁnal good producers’ optimal strategy is to enter as integrated manufacturers; and in the absence
of outsourcing ﬁnal good producers the optimal strategy of intermediate good producers is not
to enter. This is one consequence of the above-discussed entry complementarity. And Grossman
and Helpman also show that there is no mixed equilibrium in which some ﬁnal good producers
insource while others outsource.69 Finally, they show that a unique stable equilibrium exists, in
which ﬁnal good producers integrate when AV <A O and outsource when AV >A O.70 It follows
that structural features determine whether integration or outsourcing prevails.
The analysis so far has focused on the equilibrium organizational form, which does not depend on
the size of the economy. Together with a resource constraint, our equilibrium conditions determine
69An exception is a special case in which the parameters of the economy are such that AV = AO.
70Recall the deﬁnitions of the demand levels AV and AO;a tAV an integrated ﬁrm just breaks even, while at AO
and a ratio M/N = rO of entrants an outsourcing ﬁrm just breaks even.
32the number of entrants. The main implication is that the number of entrants rises proportionately
with the size of the economy. Namely, if, say, the labor force doubles, so does the number of entrants
in an equilibrium with integrated ﬁrms only, as well as in an outsourcing equilibrium. Under these
circumstances the opening of free trade between two countries that diﬀer only in size does not
change the equilibrium organizational form and the number of entrants in the world economy. This
is a direct consequence of the assumption that the matching function exhibits constant returns to
scale, because with this sort of matching technology the probabilities of ﬁnding suppliers or buyers
of intermediate inputs do not depend on the number of entrants, only on their ratio N/M,a n d
therefore the critical demand levels AV and AO do not depend on market size.
In the absence of constant returns to scale in matching the probabilities of a match, µ(N,M)/N
and µ(N,M)/M, depend not only on the ratio of entrants M/N but also on the absolute number
of entrants. As a result, there is feedback from country size to organizational form. When µ(N,M)
exhibits increasing returns to scale two stable equilibria can coexist: one with integration, the other
with outsourcing. Moreover, in this case outsourcing is more likely the larger the country is, because
larger market size raises the probability of a match for both buyers and sellers of intermediate inputs
for every ratio of entrants N/M. This implies that opening trade between two countries that diﬀer
only in size makes outsourcing more likely. In particular, it is possible to have a situation in which
every country in isolation is too small to support an outsourcing equilibrium, yet by opening to
trade, the world economy sustains an outsourcing equilibrium (see also McLaren (2000)). If the
outsourcing equilibrium is unique, it implies that trade changes the organization of production
from integration to outsourcing. More generally, increasing returns to matching imply that market
integration encourages outsourcing through the thick-market eﬀect.71
One drawback of this approach is that, in an outsourcing equilibrium, international trade in
intermediate inputs results from the random matches of buyers and sellers from diﬀerent countries.
Although the volume of trade in intermediate inputs is well determined in both directions, it is
not related to a deliberate eﬀort of ﬁnal good producers in one country to seek out suppliers of
parts in a diﬀerent country. In other words, in this model oﬀshoring is not a strategic choice of
business ﬁrms. The approach described in the next section makes explicit the oﬀshoring decision
and introduces a role for diﬀerent degrees of contract incompleteness. It also introduces natural
asymmetries into the matching of ﬁnal good producers and suppliers of intermediate inputs.
Grossman and Helpman (2003, 2005) develop a diﬀerent variant of organizational choice under
incomplete contracts, in which technological proximity between ﬁnal good producers and suppliers
of intermediate inputs plays a key role. In this model ﬁrms choose in which country to search for
an outsourcing partner, and countries may diﬀer in their degrees of contract incompleteness. These
71The above described model is special in many ways. It clariﬁes, however, the role of market thickness in the link
between trade and the organization of production. One of its stark implications is that all ﬁrms choose the same
organizational form. To avoid this outcome, one can introduce heterogeneity. Thus, for example, one could divide
explicitly the ﬁxed costs into entry and operating ﬁxed costs. By paying the ﬁxed entry cost a ﬁnal good producer
would ﬁnd out its productivity θ, drawn from a known distribution, as in Melitz (2003). After that the ﬁnal good
producer would decide whether to outsource, integrate, or leave the industry. Under these circumstances outsourcing
could coexist with integration, whereby low-productivity ﬁrms outsource while high-productivity ﬁrms integrate.
33modiﬁcations introduce separate roles for variations across countries in market thickness, legal
systems, and other institutional features, as determinants of the sourcing strategies of business
ﬁrms.
To understand the basic mechanism of outsourcing in Grossman and Helpman (2003, 2005), con-
sider a simpliﬁed version of a closed economy in which integration is not an option. An industry sup-
plies a diﬀerentiated product with an isoelastic demand function for every brand x(j)=Ap(j)
−ε,
ε =1 /(1 − α) > 1. A unit of x(j) is produced with one unit of a tailor-made intermediate input
that has no other uses, and it takes one unit of labor to manufacture one unit of the intermediate
input by specialized suppliers of parts.
There are N ﬁnal good producers, each one specializing in a diﬀerent brand, and M producers of
intermediate inputs. Unlike the previous model, however, in which N and M were ﬁnite numbers,
now M is a ﬁnite number while N is a mass. In this formulation each supplier serves many
downstream ﬁrms. The ﬁnal good producers are all located on the circumference of a circle of
length one. This circumference represents a technology space; a point in this space represents the
expertise of an intermediate good producer or the expertise needed by a ﬁnal good producer for her
intermediate input. The ﬁnite number of intermediate good producers is symmetrically spaced at
distance 1/M from each other, while the mass N of ﬁnal good producers is uniformly distributed
with density N at each point on the circumference. I will shortly discuss how these ﬁrms found
themselves spaced in this way. For now, take these locations as given.72
A ﬁnal good producer cannot manufacture her product without outsourcing its tailor-made
input to a supplier. The cost of manufacturing an intermediate input has two parts: a variable
cost of one unit of labor per unit output plus a ﬁxed cost of customization to the special needs of
the ﬁnal good producer. The cost of customization is proportional to the distance d in technology
space between the seller and buyer of the input, say wνd,w h e r ew is the wage rate and ν is a cost
parameter. That is, it is more costly to customize the input when the seller and buyer are far away
from each other than when they are close to each other. Under the circumstances every ﬁnal good
producer chooses to source her input from the closest supplier, with the distance d varying between
zero and 1/2M.
It is assumed that the investment in customization has to be made by the producer of the
intermediate input, and that this investment is not contractible.73 Moreover, once a ﬁnal good
producer and an intermediate input supplier form a relationship, the ﬁnal good producer is bound
to acquire her input from this partner.74
After the investment in customization, the two parties sign an order contract, which stipulates
the production of intermediates, assembly of ﬁnal goods, and the distribution of proﬁts from sales.
72The circumference of a circle is used in many applications as a space for bilateral matching. In international trade
it has been used, for example, by Helpman (1981) for matching buyers and sellers in the presence of monopolistic
competition, and by Rauch and Trindade (2003) for matching buyers and sellers in the presence of informational
frictions.
73I will introduce partial contractibility shortly.
74Here again other options are possible, such as the existence of a secondary market or the use of generic inputs.
34At this stage both parties seek to maximize joint proﬁts.75 This generates a proﬁt πO that is
distributed according to the Nash bargaining weights, which are taken to be 1/2 for each party.76
The proﬁt πO determines the incentive of the intermediate good producer to customize the input.
If πO/2 ≥ wνd, the intermediate good producer is willing to customize the product, otherwise he
is not, because the expected payoﬀ does not cover investment costs.77
In view of these considerations, we can calculate the aggregate post-entry proﬁts of an interme-
diate input producer as the sum (integral) of proﬁts across all ﬁnal good producers who purchase
from him intermediate inputs, call it ΠM. And we can calculate the post-entry proﬁts of a ﬁnal
good producer who ﬁnds herself at distance d from the nearest producer of intermediate inputs,
call it ΠN (d). Then the expected value of ΠN (d), where the expectation is taken over the distance
d, determines the expected pre-entry proﬁts of a ﬁnal good producer, call it ΠN.T oc a l c u l a t et h i s
expectation, assume that when a ﬁnal good producer enters the industry she is equally likely to be
located at any point on the circumference of the circle. And indeed, ex post, the ﬁnal good pro-
ducers are uniformly distributed in this technology space. As for the intermediate good producers,
they can each choose their location in the technology space. But in the Nash equilibrium of the
entry game they choose equal distances from each other. Moreover, entry of intermediate input
producers proceeds until the expected proﬁts ΠM equal the entry cost wfM, and entry of ﬁnal
good producers proceeds until the expected proﬁts ΠN equal the entry cost wfN. These conditions
together with the resource constraint then determine the equilibrium number of entrants, M and
N.
Note that in this model too there is complementarity between entry of the ﬁnal good and the
intermediate input producers; the more entry there is of one type the more proﬁtable is entry of
the other type. This is the thick market eﬀect. And the more suppliers of parts enter the industry
the smaller the average distance between buyers and sellers of parts is.
To introduce trade, Grossman and Helpman (2005) consider a two-country (North and South)
world, in which ﬁnal good producers enter only in North and intermediate input producers enter
in both the North and the South. As in the closed economy described above, ﬁnal good producers
have to outsource intermediate inputs. But now they have to pay a fee for ﬁnding the location of
input suppliers in the technology space, and this fee is separate for each country. Therefore, when
the search costs for component suppliers are large enough, a ﬁnal good producer searches in one
country only, either in North or in South. This generates segmentation of input markets across
countries, and introduces a deliberate decision of where to search for a supplier. This decision
involves two considerations, in addition to search costs. First, wages diﬀer across countries, making
75Grossman and Helpman (2005) assume that at this stage, after the customization costs are sunk, there is no further
agency problem, i.e., the only agency problem exists at the customization stage. Naturally, one could introduce at
this stage too an agency problem in which there is a role for incomplete contracts, similarly to the formulation in
Sections 3.1 and 3.2.
76It is not diﬃcult to allow more general weights β and 1 − β.
77It follows that if 1/M > πO/2wν, then there exist ﬁnal good producers who cannot ﬁnd suppliers for their
specialized intermediate inputs, and they exit the industry. This is similar to the presence of an exit cutoﬀ in the
models discussed in Section 2. The discussion below proceeds under the assumption that this is indeed the case.
35it attractive to search in the low-wage South, where higher proﬁts can be shared. Second, the
number of suppliers of parts diﬀers across countries, making it attractive to search in the country
with a larger number of suppliers, where the probability of ﬁnding a good match is higher. It
follows that if search costs are the same in North and South, the outsourcing of intermediate inputs
in both countries can take place only if the number of suppliers is smaller in South.
Grossman and Helpman (2005) characterize a general equilibrium of a trading world of this
type and analyze its determinants. They ﬁnd multiple equilibria. The positive feedback that
produces multiple equilibria is the following. As more input suppliers enter a particular country,
the country becomes more attractive to ﬁnal good producers searching for suppliers of parts, because
the suppliers are more closely packed there in technology space, making it more likely for a ﬁnal good
producer to ﬁnd a supplier who will undertake the requisite investment in customization. Moreover,
the larger the number of ﬁnal good producers searching in a country, the more attractive it is for
intermediate input suppliers to set up shop there. For this reason there can be one equilibrium
with intermediate inputs produced in both countries, and another equilibrium with intermediate
inputs produced only in North.78
Focusing on an equilibrium with suppliers of parts in both countries, Grossman and Helpman
(2005) derive comparative statics results. An increase in the size of South raises the number
of suppliers of intermediate inputs in South and lowers their number in North; the volume of
outsourcing rises in South and declines in North; the volume of trade rises relative to income; and
the wage rises in South relative to North. That is, unlike in a neoclassical world, here growth in
labor of one type does not reduce its relative factor reward. In addition, uniform improvements
across countries in the customization technology have no eﬀect on the numbers of input suppliers,
the volumes of outsourcing, the relative wage, or the volume of trade relative to income. But
improvements in customization that are biased toward South increase the entry of parts suppliers
in South, reduce their entry in North, and shift outsourcing from North to South. Moreover, such
improvements in technology raise the relative wage of South and the volume of trade relative to
income.
O n em a ya r g u et h a tc o m p u t e r - a i d e dm a n u f a c t u ring and computer-aided design have reduced
the cost of customization. If so, then this analysis suggests that the observed patterns of outsourcing
and trade expansion cannot be explained by this technological improvement alone, unless we have
reason to believe that it has been particularly eﬀective in reducing customization costs in South.
To discuss the impact of diﬀerent degrees of contract incompleteness, Grossman and Helpman
(2005) extend the model at the customization stage. Instead of assuming that the investment in
customization is not contractible, they assume that a fraction of this investment is contractible, and
that the supplier of an intermediate input and its potential buyer negotiate an investment contract,
which speciﬁes an upfront payment for the contractible part of the investment. As a result, there
78In a two-country world the positive feedback is limited by a relative wage response, which stems from the fact
that expanding economic activity in a country raises the demand for its labor, which raises in turn its wage relative
to the wage in the other country. This general equilibrium eﬀect limits to some extent the concentration of economic
activity in one country only, despite the presence of a thick market eﬀect.
36exists a range of distances d in which customization did not take place before (in the absence of
contractibility), but takes place now, and this range is larger the larger the fraction of contractible
investment is. It follows that contractibility enlarges the set of active matches.
This generalization has a number of implications. First, starting with no contractibility, the
introduction of a positive fraction of contractible customization costs in North increases the number
of suppliers of parts in North, reduces their number in South, and raises the relative wage of North.
As a result, the volume of outsourcing rises in North, declines in South, and trade relative to income
shrinks. Second, an improvement in contracting institutions in South, which raises the contractible
fraction of customization costs there, may not expand outsourcing in South. When a signiﬁcant
fraction of customization costs are contractible in North but not in South, initial improvements
in contractibility in South raise outsourcing in both South and North, raise South’s relative wage,
and raise the trade volume relative to income. But once the fraction of contractible costs crosses a
threshold, further improvements in contractibility in South reduce outsourcing there, further raise
outsourcing in North, reduce the relative wage of South, and diminish the ratio of trade to income.
In other words, the response to better contracting institutions in South is not monotonic, and it
depends on how far the South’s institutions lag behind those of North. This non-monotonicity
has no simple intuitive explanation; it results from a complex interaction between direct eﬀects of
changes in the degree of contractibility and indirect eﬀects that operated through labor and product
markets in the general equilibrium.
The analysis has so far dealt with outsourcing, where the choice is between the acquisition
of intermediate inputs at home (in North) or abroad (in South). Grossman and Helpman (2003)
discuss a variant of the same model in which a ﬁnal good producer can either outsource or integrate,
but this tradeoﬀ is analyzed at the expense of abandoning the endogeneity of wages and the tradeoﬀ
between locating the activity in North or South. In particular, they assume that the production
of intermediates takes place in South, so that intermediates are oﬀshored, and a ﬁrm has to decide
only whether to produce its intermediates in a subsidiary or acquire them at arm’s-length from an
unaﬃliated supplier. And they assume constant wages in every country.
The tradeoﬀ is the following. As in Grossman and Helpman (2002), an integrated ﬁrm has
a cost disadvantage in producing intermediates. Therefore, while a specialized supplier of parts
needs only one unit of labor per unit of intermediate input, a ﬁnal good producer needs 1/θ > 1
units of labor per unit of intermediate input, where θ is common to all ﬁrms. But, the ﬁnal good
producer has a cost advantage in customization; his customization costs are zero while a specialized
supplier of parts bears customization costs wνd, which are (as before) proportional to the distance
in technology space between him and the producer of the ﬁnal good. As a result, a ﬁnal good
producer who chooses integration makes proﬁts ΠV , which can be calculated in the usual way.
A ﬁnal good producer who chooses outsourcing seeks out the closest supplier of parts in technol-
ogy space, and negotiates with him an investment contract (to be followed by an order contract after
customization takes place). The largest distance d that makes such a relationship viable depends
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Figure 9: Choice of integration versus outsourcing depends on technological distance from input
supplier
in customization, the larger this distance. If follows that the proﬁts of an outsourcing ﬁnal good
producer depend on how far she is from the closest supplier of parts, ΠN (d).
Figure 9 depicts the proﬁts ΠV and ΠN (d) as functions of the distance d.N a t u r a l l y ,ΠV is ﬂat,
because it does not depend on this distance. But ΠN (d) is ﬂat up to dS, and declines gradually
after a downward drop at dS,w h e r edS is deﬁned as the largest distance at which the supplier has
an incentive to customize the input without an investment contract. The ﬂat part results from the
fact that up to distance dS the supplier’s payoﬀ from the order contract, which is independent of
the distance d, exceeds the customization costs, in which case no investment contract is signed and
the supplier of parts invests in customization nevertheless.79 Just slightly above dS, however, the
customization costs wνd exceed the supplier’s payoﬀ from the order contract, in which case the
supplier of parts does not invest in customization unless an investment contract is signed, and the
equilibrium investment contract allocates the customization costs equally between the supplier and
the buyer of intermediate inputs. The larger the distance between the two parties the larger the
contribution of the ﬁnal good producer to the customization costs and the smaller her proﬁts.
Under these circumstances there exists a critical distance dO,w h i c hs a t i s ﬁes ΠN (dO)=ΠV ,
such that all ﬁnal good producers with d<d O prefer to outsource and all ﬁnal good producers
with d>d O prefer to integrate (or exit if ΠN (d) < 0). Since d is random before entry, we can use
the uniform distribution of location on the circumference of the circle together with the number of
intermediate input producers to calculate the expected proﬁts of a ﬁnal good producer who enters
the industry. Entry proceeds until these expected proﬁts, net of entry cost, equal zero. We can
79Let PS be the supplier’s payoﬀ from the order contract, the same for all d.T h e na tdS this payoﬀ just equals the
customization costs wνdS, i.e., wνdS = PS.
38similarly calculate the free entry condition for intermediate good producers.
Grossman and Helpman (2003) ﬁnd that outsourcing is more prevalent in larger markets, and
that the thick market eﬀect is responsible for the positive correlation between market size and
the fraction of outsourcing ﬁrms and their market share. They also ﬁnd that better contracting
institutions in South, which render larger fractions of the customization costs contractible, increase
the prevalence of outsourcing.
Analyzing the tradeoﬀ between outsourcing at home or abroad and the tradeoﬀ between out-
sourcing or integration, provides useful insights but it gives only a partial view of organizational
choices. A complete analysis requires simultaneously allowing ﬁrms to choose between outsourcing
and integration in every country, thereby admitting an interaction between the oﬀshoring decision
and the internalization decision. No such analysis exists for the class of models discussed in this
section, only for the model discussed in Section 3.3.
3.5 Ricardian Comparative Advantage
Diﬀerences across countries in legal systems and institutions that shape the enforcement of con-
tracts, and thereby the degree of contract incompleteness, have the potential for inﬂuencing pat-
terns of comparative costs across countries. Ricardian comparative advantage, as reﬂected in the
cross sectoral variation in productivity levels, can arise as a result of institutional variation across
countries when the relative requirement of contract-dependent inputs varies across sectors, because
institutions impact costs in sectors with a larger need for contract-dependent inputs relatively more
than in sectors with less need for contract-dependent inputs.
Nunn (2005) provides a detailed empirical analysis of the impact of the degree of contract in-
completeness on international trade ﬂows.80 As the main representative of the degree of contract
incompleteness, he uses a measure of the rule of law, which consists of a weighted average of a
number of variables that gauge the eﬀectiveness of the judiciary, its predictability, and its enforce-
ment of contracts.81 He ﬁnds that the results do not change much when this variable is replaced
with other, more objective measures of the eﬃcacy of courts.82 To compute an index of contract
dependence for every ﬁnal good sector, Nunn uses U.S. input-output tables to compute the pro-
portion of intermediate inputs used in every ﬁnal good, and he classiﬁes intermediates into those
that are traded on an organized exchange, those that have a reference price, and those that have
none of these.83 He assumes that a good is more contract dependent the larger is the fraction of
its intermediate inputs that have no organized exchange nor a reference price, or alternatively, the
80Levchenko (2004), who preceded Nunn (2005), makes related arguments. I focus on Nunn (2005), however,
because he provides the sharper empirical analysis. Both Levchenko and Nunn develop simple theoretical models to
guide their empirical work.
81These variables are estimated from subjective perceptions; see Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2003).
82These objective measure are from Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2003), and they are available
f o ras m a l l e rs a m p l eo fc o u n t r i e s .
83The classiﬁcation of inputs into those that have an organized exchange, those that have a reference price, and
those that have no organized exchange and no reference price is from Rauch (1999).
39larger is the fraction of its intermediate inputs that have no organized exchange only. The main
empirical ﬁnding is that countries with better legal systems export relatively more in sectors that
are more intensive in contract-dependent inputs. This ﬁnding is robust to controls of other determi-
nants of trade ﬂows, alternative speciﬁcations of the estimated equation, and alternative estimation
methods. Moreover, not only has the quality of the legal system a statistically signiﬁcant impact
on trade ﬂows, it also has a large economic impact. In particular, its impact, as measured by the
beta coeﬃcient, is of similar magnitude to that of human capital and physical capital combined.
In other words, contracting institutions are an important source of comparative advantage.
Acemoglu, Antràs and Helpman (2006) propose a model in which Ricardian comparative ad-
vantage emerges from the interaction of contract incompleteness with the deliberate choice of tech-
nology by ﬁnal good producers. In their model, a ﬁnal good producer can choose how to divide
the production process, so as to have many or few intermediate inputs. Every intermediate input
has to be contracted for. The supplier of the input, who can be a worker in the ﬁrm or an outside
supplier, has to execute a set of activities in order to produce it. A subset of these activities are
contractible, while the others are not. The fraction of noncontractible activities provides a measure
of contract incompleteness.
On the one hand, more sophisticated technologies – that involve more intermediate inputs in
the production process – are more costly to acquire, and they may involve larger organizational
costs. On the other hand, more sophisticated technologies are more productive. Using this tradeoﬀ
a ﬁnal good producer makes an optimal technology choice, and this choice depends on features of
the industry and the degree of contract incompleteness. Acemoglu, Antràs and Helpman (2006) ﬁnd
that better contracting institutions lead to the choice of more sophisticated technologies, and that
the impact of contracting institutions on technology choice is relatively larger in sectors with lower
elasticities of substitution across intermediate inputs, because low substitutability makes the sector
more sensitive to contractual frictions. As a result, countries with better contracting institutions
have a relative productivity advantage, and therefore comparative advantage, in sectors with less
substitutable inputs.
Costinot (2005) proposes a diﬀerent model, in which contracting institutions interact with
technological features to create Ricardian comparative advantage. In his model every industry is
characterized by a set of tasks that have to be performed, and these sets are exogenous. Industries
are ordered by the complexity of their technology, which is measured by the number of tasks in
their set. Workers are assigned to tasks. A worker has to spend a ﬁxed amount of time to learn a
particular task. As a result, there are increasing returns to scale in the performance of tasks. But a
worker can shirk, and not perform his task. In the event of shirking no output is produced, because
every task is essential. The degree of contract incompleteness is measured by the probability that
a worker shirks, which is exogenous and independent across workers.
When a team of workers produces a product, it is eﬃcient to assign every worker the same
number of tasks. Given the size of the team, it is then possible to compute expected output per
worker. The resulting optimal team size, which maximizes output per worker, is larger in more
40complex industries and in countries with better legal institutions, in which contracts are enforced
with higher probabilities. In a competitive economy better institutions raise output per worker
proportionately more in more complex industries. As a result, a country with better contract-
enforcing institutions gains a comparative advantage in more complex industries.
4C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
New developments in the world economy have called for new developments in the theory of inter-
national trade and foreign directed investment, designed to better understand the shifts in trade
and investment patterns and the reorganization of production across national boarders. Although
traditional trade theory has much to oﬀer in explaining parts of this puzzle, such as the interna-
tional fragmentation of production,84 the theory had to be generalized in order to provide a better
understanding of the trends in the data. Particularly acute has been the need to model diﬀerent
forms and degrees of involvement of business ﬁrms in foreign activities, because organizational
change has been a central element in the transformation of the world economy. As a result, theo-
retical reﬁnements have focused on the individual ﬁrm, studying its choices in response to its own
characteristics, the nature of the industry in which it operates, and the opportunities aﬀorded by
foreign trade and investment. Important among these choices are modes of serving foreign markets
and sourcing strategies.
But the theory went beyond the individual ﬁrm, studying the implications of ﬁrm behavior for
the structure of an industry, and, by implication, structural diﬀerences across industries. These
variations deliver new explanations for trade structure and patterns of FDI, both within and across
industries. For example, they identify new sources of comparative advantage, such as the degree of
heterogeneity within industries and the quality of contracting institutions.
Heterogeneity plays a key role in this literature in two ways. First, there is heterogeneity
as a result of productivity diﬀerences across ﬁrms within industries, because some ﬁrms happen
to be luckier than others.85 Second, there is heterogeneity in organizational form. The two are
related, however, because diﬀerences in productivity induce diﬀerent choices for the organization
of production and distribution. In this theory, trade and FDI patterns are jointly determined with
organizational structures, such as sourcing and integration strategies.
Some implications of these models have been tested empirically. Examples include the sorting
patterns of ﬁrms into exporters and foreign direct investors. Other implications have not been
tested. These include patterns of sorting into outsourcing at home, integration at home, outsourcing
abroad, and integration abroad, because this cannot be done with the available data sets. More
generally, hypotheses that require detailed ﬁrm-level data about trade in diﬀerent types of products,
such as intermediate inputs versus ﬁnal goods, and whether this trade takes place within the
boundary of the ﬁrm or at arm’s-length, cannot be examined. The theoretical models point out,
84See Jones (2000).
85The empirical literature supports the view that causality goes from productivity to, say, exports, rather than the
other way around; see, for example, Bernard and Jensen (1999) and Clerides, Lach and Tybout (1998).
41however, what additional data need to be collected in order to improve the empirical analysis. Since
this is still a lively area of research, we can expect to see much more theoretical and empirical work
on these topics.
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